Quina va ser la inversió pública a la recerca de la vacuna mRNA per a covid?

US public investment in development of mRNA covid-19 vaccines: retrospective cohort study

 Allò que observem i es veu reflectit als diaris no és pas necessàriament el que passa. Ho sabem. La dificultat es troba en esbrinar com la immediatesa de la informació perd peces importants a considerar per comprendre la realitat. L'exemple de la inversió pública en vacunes és molt clar. Hi va haver unes empreses que van fer accessible la vacuna a la població, però qui va invertir realment per arribar a aquest final?.

Al BMJ trobareu una resposta parcial, la part d'inversió pública nordamericana en R+D, que abans de la pandèmia va ser de 336,8 milions de $ i durant la pandèmia va ser de 2.365,7 milions de $, un total de 2.704,5 milions de $. Es tracta d'una xifra notable que ja s'havia recollit aproximadament en una publicació anterior de Richard Frank a Health Affairs. La taula adjunta explica els detalls de qui hi va contribuir i amb quin import:

I recordeu el que deia ahir de Barney Graham i el seu paper decisiu?. Doncs si, més enllà dels diners hi ha persones. En Barney surt a la taula anterior a l'epígraf NIAID, import 71,4 milions de $. De vegades no és tant important els recursos com la capacitat de compartir coneixement lliure que és el que va fer.

Aquest gràfic és molt il·lustratiu de les tecnologies per assolir la vacuna i la seqüència temporal:

I la conclusió de l'article amplifica la meva entrada d'ahir:

The development of mRNA covid-19 vaccines during the pandemic was a monumental scientific success. This achievement was possible, in large part, because of significant US public investment in research and development during the preceding 35 years and record setting public contributions during the pandemic to accelerate and reduce the financial risk of vaccine development. The resulting mRNA vaccines have benefitted millions of people and saved millions of lives. The substantial role played by public funding should help to justify greater efforts by the US, Canadian, and German governments to assure equitable and affordable access to this lifesaving technology in the US and globally.

Europa (Alemania i UE) van aportar 500 milions a BionTech per la vacuna, la diferència és notable amb els USA. Però també és cert que BionTech es va aprofitar de l'aportació nordamericana al coneixement. Saber la contribució precisa de cadascú és complex. Ara bé, com ja vaig dir, algú s'ha de revisar molt seriosament el tema de patents perquè l'aportació pública a la recerca és massa important per ser apropiada privadament. Són precisament els ciutadans nord-americans els que haurien d'impulsar-ho més, però no és així. Algú ha assenyalat que precisament aquesta protecció de patents és la que permet dominar la tecnologia des dels USA. És a dir, inverteixen més que ningú, protegeixen més que ningú, s'apropien del resultat més que ningú només aquells que converteixen el resultat de la recerca en actiu financer. Aquest és el cicle del domini tecnològic i econòmic. Europa mentrestant dorm.

PD. Aquest gràfic ho resumeix molt bé. Quin és el ranking de capitalització de les empreses tecnológiques del món? N'hi ha alguna d'europea? Només una i al final...Explicat el dimecres per en Martin Wolf.

Public funding of succesful Pharma R&D

Contribution of NIH funding to new drug approvals 2010–2016

If we consider the 210 new molecular entities (NMEs) approved by the Food and Drug Administration from 2010–2016, then you'll find that NIH funding contributed to published research associated with every one. A PNAS article explains that:

Collectively, this research involved 200,000 years of grant funding totaling more than $100 billion. The analysis shows that 90% of this funding represents basic research related to the biological targets for drug action rather than the drugs themselves. The role of NIH funding thus complements industry research and development, which focuses predominantly on applied research. This work underscores the breath and significance
of public investment in the development of new therapeutics and the risk that reduced research funding would slow the pipeline for treating morbid disease.

This public funding is forgotten in the costs of a new molecule. Although in the price, the manufacturer surplus doesn't remunerate such contribution. Some adjustment should be applied, to be fair.

 Brassai at Mapfre Foundation in Barcelona

Is this the end, my friend?

The last 25 years of publicly funded health care have been marked by the unique ownership structure known as consortium. Consortia allowed a joint venture between ancient non-profit hospitals created by civil society and the public administration. The underlying rationale for such an ownership structure is strictly related to capital investment demand. Since non-profit foundations could not raise enough funds to fulfill new techonology and population health needs, the public sector funded new investments and participated in the boards of directors.
These sounds quite normal, it is a historic evolution and has a clear and common sense argument. However, public sector has not been able to include depreciation and replacement costs in the tariff and this has created greater need for resources.
Unfortunately, those consortia that had management autonomy and public administration in the boards are now being dispossessed from its original owners -the non-profit foundations- and being converted into public organizations.
This is a clear social plundering commited by the spanish Parliament in a recent law. You may have more details in this article (check p.46).
Is this the end? I think so, unless there is a clear mandate to change current regulation. Its impact maybe enormous: disappearing boards of directors, employees converted into "de facto" civil servants and its equivalent remuneration, and the most important: there is no reverse gear.
It is worrying how politicians can accept such a loss of dynamic efficiency before their very eyes. It is unacceptable that social created capital can be plungered this way. Politicians can stop the end of consortia, they should stop it.

PS. Two years ago I was blogging on the same topic. Unfortunately all the alerts were neglected.

PS. Must read, on ebola by I. Hernández.

Què hem de fer?

Aquesta és una pregunta que em fan de forma repetida. Acabo una conferència sobre crisi econòmica i salut, i després privadament em mostren la preocupació davant tanta incertesa. Moments després sorgeix la qüestió clau. Jo sempre responc que hi ha dos nivells, l'individual i el social. La resposta individual la donem amb el nostre comportament i decisions en l'àmbit professional, entre d'altres. I per tant els retorno la pregunta, amb una reflexió. Els dic que segurament coneixen aspectes que cal millorar, iniciatives que impulsen l'eficiència i les han deixades per un altre dia, aquest altre dia ha arribat.
La resposta social és més complexa de formular, perquè cal destriar qui té la decisió i sobre què la té. En aquest blog hi ha diverses entrades que van en aquest sentit. Però els acabo dient que la política sanitària en aquest moment necessita de política en majúscules. Just el contrari del que observem. És la confiança i la credibilitat de la política, la característica clau que necessita el moment que vivim. (I si miro el diari d'avui ja s'anuncia que caldrà modificar el decret del dimarts pels desgavells que provoca, molts ja ho sabíem des del primer moment.)
Com que el problema profund va més enllà de la política sanitària, ens convé resoldre els fonaments abans de posar parets. I avui en Ferran Requejo ho fa magníficament a LV. Explica els tres escenaris: seguir, canvi de govern o convocatòria d'eleccions. Els escenaris 2 i 3 són complementaris, i s'enfoquen cap a l'Estat propi.
L'anàlisi que en fa és encertada i venint de qui ve, cal tenir-la en compte.

PS. Nou EUROHEALTH sobre Financial Crisis and Health Systems.

PS. Lectures: Skidelsky, XSM, Guillem López-Casasnovas, Krugman i Krugman.

PS. I avui sobretot toca llegir WSJ que va sobre Catalunya.

Catalans have additional reasons to question the Spanish government's capacity for change. Of late Mr. Rajoy has been blaming Spain's regional governments for the country's deficit overruns, saying that wayward local spending had jeopardized the entire nation's creditworthiness. Madrid has threatened to intervene in the regional governments' budgets if they don't tidy their books on their own.

Carlos III put Spain on the road to overinvestment.

But according to Andreu Mas-Colell, Catalonia's economy minister, the real story is a little different. He explains that with the exception of the Basque Country, Spain's 17 regions enjoy spending autonomy but almost no revenue autonomy. It's up to the central government to decide how nationwide revenue gets distributed between regions, and there's no guarantee that what a region's citizens pay to Madrid is returned euro-for-euro in funding to that region.
That means the central government can make its own budget shortfalls look smaller—and the regional governments' look bigger—simply by keeping more of the revenue pot to itself.
The result? Catalonia is the seat of Spanish industry and one of the most important industrial districts in Europe, lagging only the likes of Italy's Lombardy and the German Ruhr in productivity. Yet each year since 1986, an average of 9% of Catalonia's GDP in net terms has left the region to be redistributed or spent by Madrid. In Spain, only the Balearic Islands surrender a larger share of their annual output. Nowhere else in Europe or North America do intra-national transfers of such size occur as a matter of course.
"In discretionary expenses we feel we have been historically shortchanged," Mr. Mas-Colell says. "We represent 15% of the population, and we represent close to 18% in terms of GNP. . . . In this year's budget, the investment in Catalonia is 11% of public investment in Spain."
"There are inefficiencies in the autonomous communities for sure," he adds. "But not to a larger extent than the inefficiencies in the central administration. . . . Spain in all its components has to gain on efficiency, on liberalization, on flexibility."
Seen this way, Madrid's threats to recentralize fiscal policy look like a political play that distracts from reforms that could actually help the regional governments close their budget gaps. Mr. Mas-Colell says that it's up to Madrid, for instance, to make regulatory changes that would enable hospitals to charge for prescriptions, meals and overnight stays, as his government is trying to do.
He also notes that Barcelona has cut government employees' wages. Madrid hasn't.
It's a little bewildering that Madrid would choose to inflame separatist feeling in Catalonia at a time of national crisis. More than 40% of Catalans now say they'd support seceding from Spain. But Madrid's centuries-long jiu-jitsu with the regions suggests something about the national character, according to Germà Bel, an economist at the University of Barcelona. Centralized control, Mr. Bel told me, is in "the genetics of the Spanish state."
The example Mr. Bel and others like to use is infrastructure investment, which Spain's leaders since the 17th century have deployed to affirm their rule and proclaim the Spanish nation. Today Spain, the fifth largest EU member state by GDP and by population, has more international airports and more miles of motorways than any other country in Continental Europe. It has more miles of high-speed rail than any country in the world except China; it also has the lowest ridership per mile of high-speed rail in the world. More miles of high-speed rail are currently under construction in Spain than in all other EU countries combined.

PS. I si encara teniu ganes de saber com es poden augmentar les inversions al sistema sanitari el 2011 en un 19,44 % en un sol any només heu de consultar aquest document (p.4) i si voleu saber com es pot gastar un 22% més que Catalunya aneu a p.21. I la pregunta immediata és per què no ho hem fet nosaltres? I la resposta ja la sabeu. El problema el tenim a casa i té nom i cognoms.

PS. Quan costa ser catalans?

Are Pharmaceutical Companies Earning Too Much?

Are Pharmaceutical Companies Earning Too Much?

Estimated Research and Development Investment Needed to Bring a New Medicine to Market, 2009-2018

The debate about pharmaceutical companies earnings is a never ending story. Now you can find in JAMA an article that reflects the cost of a new drug: $1336 million. This is the summary:

The FDA approved 355 new drugs and biologics over the study period. Research and development expenditures were available for 63 (18%) products, developed by 47 different companies. After accounting for the costs of failed trials, the median capitalized research and development investment to bring a new drug to market was estimated at $985.3 million (95% CI, $683.6 million-$1228.9 million), and the mean investment was estimated at $1335.9 million (95% CI, $1042.5 million-$1637.5 million) in the base case analysis. Median estimates by therapeutic area (for areas with ≥5 drugs) ranged from $765.9 million (95% CI, $323.0 million-$1473.5 million) for nervous system agents to $2771.6 million (95% CI, $2051.8 million-$5366.2 million) for antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents.

Why this new figure is relevant? Because previous estimates said that it was the more than the double!

The mean estimate of $1.3 billion in the present study was lower than the $2.8 billion (in 2018 US dollars) reported by DiMasi et al,

And   my impression is that we have entered in a difficult world to estimate the real cost. Right now many firms are buying research (buying firms that have already a product close to be commercialised) and they are paying a premium for outsourcing research. Therefore, how to estimate the cost in this situations? Uncertain.

David Cutler asks about the earnings of pharma firms and says:

Ledley showed that from 2000 to 2018, the median net income margin in the pharmaceutical industry was 13.8% annually, compared with 7.7% in the S&P 500  sample. This difference was statistically significant, even with controls, although earnings seemed to be declining over time.

Is this positive return differential evidence of too high a return? Not necessarily. The economics of pharmaceuticals are important to consider. Like several other industries (eg, software and motion picture production), the pharmaceutical industry has very high fixed cost and very low marginal cost. It takes substantial investment to discover a drug or develop a complex computer code, but the cost of producing an extra pill or allowing an extra download is minimal. The way that firms recoup these fixed costs is by charging above cost for the product once it is made. If these upfront costs are not accounted for, the return on the marketed good will look very high.

 Paying more than a drug is worth clinically is not a good strategy. Even if a drug is worth a high price socially, pricing patients who need the drug out of the market is a real loss, even if it leads to more innovation in the future. In still another case, price increases for older, generic drugs serve no innovation purpose. But, as a general rule, it is important to be wary of blunt “lower all drug prices” policies.

Cutler doesn't say too much on price according value and about public funding of research. It leaves the initial question open and waiting for adhoc answers. That's it , it's a complicated issue, no general prescriptions, they need to be adjusted to specific conditions without a captured regulator. This last point is the most difficult one to overcome.

Prix Pictet

Digital health futures

 The Lancet and Financial Times Commission on governing health futures 2030: growing up in a digital world

The governance of digital technologies in health and health care must be driven by public purpose, not private profit. Its primary goals should be to address the power asymmetries reinforced by digital transformations, increase public trust in the digital health ecosystem, and ensure that the opportunities offered by digital technologies and data are harnessed in support of the missions of public health and UHC. To achieve these goals, we propose four action areas that we consider game-changers for shaping health futures in a digital world.

First, we suggest that decision makers, health professionals, and researchers consider—and address— digital technologies as increasingly important determinants of health. Second, we emphasise the need to build a governance architecture that creates trust in digital health by enfranchising patients and vulnerable groups, ensuring health and digital rights, and regulating powerful players in the digital health ecosystem. Third, we call for a new approach to the collection and use of health data based on the concept of data solidarity, with the aim of simultaneously protecting individual rights, promoting the public good potential of such data, and building a culture of data justice and equity. Finally, we urge decision makers to invest in the enablers of digitally transformed health systems, a task that will require strong country ownership of digital health strategies and clear investment roadmaps that help prioritise those technologies that are most needed at different levels of digital health maturity.

 Neus Martin, Galeria Barnadas

I la "salut a totes les polítiques", on ha anat a parar?

MAKING HEALTH PUBLIC. A Manifesto for a New Social Contract

Lessons from the demise of Public Health England: where next for UK public health? 

A Anglaterra després de la pandèmia, l'agència de salut pública en va sortir perjudicada per tot el que havia passat. Va desaparèixer i en van crear dues: UK Health Security Agency and the Office for Health Improvement and Disparities. Però en Peter Littlejohns et al. en un llibre acabat de sortir ens expliquen que caldria una alternativa diferent, caldria bastir un nou contracte social.

Al llibre primer repassen com han arribat fins aquí, i aquest gràfic ho resumeix:

i com diferents determinants de la salut es dilueixen en moltes agències:

i precisament per això cal revisar en profunditat l'organització i la coordinació.

I acaba així:

Unless our broken political and governance system, with its numerous systemic failings, is confronted, then attempts to tackle complex problems like public health, which requires long- term commitment, proper investment and a relentless focus on delivery, will fail.

Tinc la impressió que els britànics han fet marxa enrera els darrers anys en moltes de les polítiques de salut, i no només en els resultats, també en les idees i la capacitat de dur-les a la pràctica. Ara bé tenen una capacitat d'explicar-ho i criticar-ho que no tenim aquí. Una reflexió sobre l'organització que tenim de la salut pública seria especialment desitjable. Es precisament aquest pensament crític el que crec que ens convindria replicar.

El Pla Interdepartamental i Intersectorial de Salut Pública (PINSAP) de la Generalitat de Catalunya era una iniciativa pionera alineada amb les recomanacions de l’Organització Mundial de la Salut (OMS) per impulsar la salut des de tots els àmbits de l’acció del Govern i la societat, és a dir “salut a totes les polítiques” i va desaparèixer de les prioritats governamentals d'aquí el 2020, i ningú ha dit res al Parlament a hores d'ara. Ara farà una dècada que va començar i no he sabut veure cap avaluació recent de l'impacte. Molt trist tot plegat, podem fer desaparèixer prioritats i polítiques sense dir res, i no passa res. Després de tants esforços, ha anat a parar a la paperera de la història?

PS. Si voleu donar pistes a la nova ministra sobre com posar en marxa l'agència de salut pública o com no fer-ho, l'informe original en pdf és de fet millor que el llibre. El títol de llibre té atractiu, però el contingut del contracte social és imprecís.

Repensar estratègies de salut

Health for All – transforming economies to deliver what matters 

El Director General de la OMS va encarregar un informe l'any 2020 al que van anomenar WHO Council on the economics of health for all per tal de repensar les polítiques de la OMS sobre 4 fonaments i un conjunt de recomanacions han sorgit aquest 2023 que es mostren resumidament en aquest gràfic:

Al BMJ hi trobareu també un article sobre la qüestió. 

Firstly, it argues that we must value health for all. This means embedding the goal of human and planetary wellbeing in economic decision making and in how we measure economic progress. 

Secondly, it argues for a redesign of national and international financial systems to treat spending on health as a long term investment, and to increase the fiscal space available for this investment. 

Thirdly, it argues for an innovation ecosystem that prioritises the common good, ensuring equitable access to health innovations.

Finally, as covid-19 made clear, public sector leadership matters. Achieving ambitious health goals requires governments with the capacity to structure effective partnerships, adapt, coordinate cross-ministerial collaboration, and meaningfully engage the public. Governments’ addiction to outsourcing core functions has undermined these capabilities.A reinvigorated understanding of the state as a market shaper, and investment in dynamic state capabilities, are crucial to delivering Health for All

Temes repetits una i altra vegada per Mazzucato en diferents llocs i articles. Que la salut és una inversió a llarg termini ja ho sabíem fa temps. L'informe repeteix coses que sabem i que no s'hi fa prou cas.

Road safety at the top of Health in All Policies

Cost savings associated with 10 years of road safety policies in Catalonia

You can get a clear understanding of the impressive results of road safety policies with a quick look at this excellent article. The summary:

A substantial reduction in deaths from road traffic collisions was observed between 2000 and 2010. Between 2001 and 2010, with the implementation of new road safety policies, there were 26 063 fewer road traffic collisions with victims than expected, 2909 fewer deaths (57%) and 25 444 fewer hospitalizations. The estimated total cost savings were around €18 000 million. Of these, around 97% resulted from reductions in lost productivity. Of the remaining cost savings, 63% were associated with specialized health care, 15% with adapting to disability and 8.1% with hospital care.

In my opinion, next steps for additional reductions  in traffic accidents should be adressed with investment in renovation of roads. A clear example of such need is this recent demonstration or the current and tragic situation of N-II and other roads in Girona. You can follow it by twitter at  #VergonyaN2. Otherwise, you can watch this documentary, and you'll confirm how politicians can neglect citizens for years. After a decade, Catalonia is still waiting for public  investment coming from neighbouring country. Hopefully we will not have to wait for another decade. Soon we'll just keep our taxes and we'll belong to a new State. I't just a compelling argument to prevent mortality.

PS. WHO on Health in All Policies.

PS. On Moisés Broggi death. An interview included in the book "What Catalans want".

Investing heavily

Global Healthcare Private Equity Report 2013

Healthcare represents about 10% of global private equity in general. Since this is more or less the proportion of health expenditures on the GDP would sound normal. However, since more or less two thirds of this expenditure is public in western countries, we can say that currently private equity may be overweighted in health sector, compared to others. The reason is that private equity may expect better returns in healhcare than in other parts of the economy.
Anyway, if you are interested in the details of what's going on, I suggest you to have a look at: Global Healthcare Private Equity Report 2013.
A key message about who is investing and where:

One clear theme that emerged in 2012, however, was the growing level of private equity firms’ interest in healthcare in China, India and across the Asia-Pacifi c region (see Figure 3). With opportunities abounding and restrictions on foreign direct investment relaxing to some extent, Western funds are building up their presence in Asia-Pacifi c by opening new offi ces, especially in China and Southeast Asia. Over the next several years, deal activity is likely to continue heating up in new geographies as it stabilizes in traditional ones.
Despite the allure of new markets, Western investors face a healthy dose of competition from local investment firms that have already taken root in the regions and strategic players searching for new outlets for growth. At the same time, investors based in the Arabian Gulf region (including sovereign wealth funds) are also investing heavily in emerging markets, with the long-term goal of bringing much-needed healthcare solutions back to their home countries. Given their unconventional investment theme, such investors are often willing to accept lower returns, consequently bidding up valuations across the board.

I always say that if you want to know about the future, it is helpful to have a conversation with a private equity investor and a headhunter. Capital and talent drive the economy, and both are interested in the appropriate allocation of risk and reward.

We all require care

The Care Crisis,What Caused It and How Can We End It?

Interesting book about care and what it means, 

Care is conceived as all the supporting activities that take place to make, remake, maintain, contain and repair the world we live in and the physical, emotional and intellectual capacities required to do so.1 In this sense, care is at the heart of making and remaking the world. The propensity to care and the work of caring are the lifeblood of our social and economic system. Care is central to the reproduction of society and thus one of its bedrocks, part of a fundamental infrastructure which holds society together. Without care, life could not be sustained.

What happens to affective relations and caring activities when they are subsumed under market forces and turned into services that are sold? As ever more areas of social life and work are directly commercialised, the affective investments of care come into conflict with logics of measure, profitability, time constraints, cost reduction, standardisation, and economies of scale in multiple ways

However, instead of considering efficient ways to provide care, the political views surpass efficiency, a well known paradigm.

Valuing care means allocating resources, not taking them away. There is an urgent need to dismantle the apparatus that allows private wealth extraction from society’s care structures, so that any new funds made available for the public care infrastructures do not simply prop up profits. Care needs to be shielded from the volatilities of financial markets, not be drawn deeper into them. Therefore, the realms of care should not be available to high-risk forms of financial investment, including private equity and debt-based forms of financial engineering, where expectations of high returns on capital are upheld at the expense of quality of employment and quality of care. Nor should public services and the care sector be exposed to free trade agreements that undermine labour, consumer and environmental protections.9 This is a pressing issue in the wake of Britain’s departure from the European Union.

 Instead of considering public funding as the main option, and access according to need and not to willingness to pay, she proposes to dismantle private services...

The satisfaction paradox and the need for a dose of realism

A paradox is a "situation that is made up of two opposite things and that seems impossible but is actually true or possible". This is exactly what is happening to satisfaction with health services in times of economic recession. Everybody would think that less budget damages satisfaction perception. What's going on is exactly the opposite. Satisfaction with health services is increasing (from 79% of people satisfied with the public system in 2006 to 88% in 2013). And this is also happening in the UK, John Appleby et al. from King's Fund say:

Overall public satisfaction with the NHS increased to 65 per cent in 2014 – the second highest level since the British Social Attitudes survey began in 1983. Dissatisfaction with the service fell to an all-time low of 15 per cent.

One interpretation of the increase in overall satisfaction for the NHS is that it is likely to reflect a vote of support for the NHS as an institution in difficult times. A lack of objective improvement in NHS services and the fact that improvements in satisfaction appear to have been driven by an 11 percentage point increase in satisfaction among Labour supporters and those without recent contact with the service, may lend weight to this analysis. This may especially be the case given that some see the NHS as currently under threat, for example from privatisation, and some feel ministers and others have been too critical of the NHS and its staff.

Official measures of performance tell a different story: NHS funding has been under increasing pressure since 2010 and there have been well-publicised performance problems with high-profile targets such as the 4-hour A&E waiting time standard and the 18-week maximum wait from referral to treatment. At the same time, the media has featured negative stories about the financial position of NHS hospitals and the need for additional investment in the service.

This context suggests a possible alternative explanation for the increase in satisfaction in 2014. We know that what drives changes in satisfaction is not straightforward – and almost certainly is never simply satisfaction with the NHS per se, for all respondents to the survey. Political beliefs, attitudes towards the government of the day, media stories and expectations of the NHS will shape people’s satisfaction.

So, while satisfaction improved in 2014, this is not necessarily synonymous with an improvement in the actual performance of the NHS, nor does it simply reflect an actual improvement in satisfaction. Nevertheless, it is clear that public satisfaction with the NHS and support for it as an institution remains high.

I suggest you have a look at the report. Satisfaction is a different dimension from performance, good point. If overall performance is based on healthy life expectancy, then the conclusion for us would be the same. We have increased healthy life expectancy all these years.

Those that complain about austerity want to forget such results. Also journalists. They don't figure out that the issue is a balanced budget and cutbacks have not been applied on an ideological foundation as some pretend. Anybody can blame over budget cuts, but immediately they would have to understand what they would do at home if their income is 7 years less than  before (2013 GDP per capita is less than those in 2006!!!). For sure they would return to an expenditure level simliar to previously,  in one way or another. Can anyone defend that these are ideological budget cuts at home?.
You can't live permanently in increasing debt, I'm satiated of cheap populism. A dose of realism is required.

PS. As you may notice, realism begins after reading the data, but you have to read them.

The deeper connection between the opportunity gap and growing income inequality

Our Kids. The American Dream in Crisis

Today I'm bringing some selected statements to you from ch. 6 of a great book by Robert Putnam. His views, properly adapted, also apply to our country. It is not only a US issue.

As income inequality expands, kids from more privileged backgrounds start and probably finish further and further ahead of their less privileged peers, even if the rate of socioeconomic mobility is unchanged.

In 1975 economist Arthur Okun famously formulated what he called “the Big Tradeoff” between equity and efficiency. We could pursue policies that would enhance social equity—say, by redistributing income through the tax system—but only at the cost of economic productivity. It is sometimes forgotten that Okun himself argued that this ironclad tradeoff does not typically apply to the pursuit of equality of opportunity. In such cases, there is no such tradeoff, because investment in poor kids raises the rate of growth for everyone, at the same time leveling the playing field in favor of poor kids.

But why should the opportunity gap matter for those of us on its lucky side? The answer is that the destiny of poor kids in America has broad implications for our economy, our democracy, and our values.

The essence of democracy is equal influence on public decisions. A representative democracy requires at least widespread, if not universal, voting and grassroots civic engagement. The more that other means of political influence, such as money, are powerful and unevenly distributed across citizens, the more important electoral and grassroots involvement becomes for ensuring some approximation to democracy.

That more educated and affluent citizens participate more actively in public affairs, and have more political knowledge and civic skills than their impoverished, ill-educated fellow citizens and are more likely to take part in virtually all forms of political and civic engagement, is one of the most robust findings of students of political behavior. So what are the implications of the growing opportunity gap for American democracy? Rich kids are more confident that they can influence government, and they are largely right about that. Not surprisingly, poor kids are less likely to try.

What can we do—as members of our communities, and as a country—to help poor kids begin to catch up with rich kids? As this book has outlined, this problem is not simple, and it does not have a simple solution

Family structure, child development and parenting, schools and community, four approaches that R. Putnam suggests to address the issue.

In our polarized public debate an unexpected consensus has begun to crystalize across ideological lines that the collapse of the working-class family is a central contributor to the growing opportunity gap.

Interesting approach, and unfinished in my modest opinion. What happens when you have the most educated generation and your country is not able to provide jobs for them? That's why we do need an State, at least to define the right policies according to our preferences.

 

PS. Angus Deaton on inequality 

Health vs. wealth in a pandemic

HEALTH VS. WEALTH? PUBLIC HEALTH POLICIES AND THE ECONOMY DURING
COVID-19

A NBER paper says:

A pandemic can impact an economy in many ways: reductions in people’s willingness
to work, dislocations in consumption patterns and lower consumption, added stress on the financial system, and greater uncertainty leading to lower investment. These are
respectively referred to as (labor) supply shocks, demand shocks, financial shocks and
uncertainty shocks. Connected economies and epidemiological communities also move in synch. Even a healthy economy, or an economy that has not mandated a shutdown, may feel the impact of external events. With the exception of the 1918 influenza, recent
pandemics have neither had as large of a global impact, nor has there been as much real
time data available to empirically assess the economic and public health impact of NPIs.
We study outcomes during the Covid-19 pandemic.
We have three main results. First, our analysis shows NPIs may have been effective
in slowing the growth rate of confirmed cases of Covid-19 but not in decreasing the growth rate of cumulative mortality. Second, we find evidence of spillovers. NPIs may have impacts on other jurisdictions. Finally, there is little evidence that NPIs are associated with larger declines in local economic activity than in places without NPIs.

A market that grows

This is the case of voluntary health insurance. Amid the current downturn, in 2012 there was an increase in the number of members (2.04%) and premiums (6.09%). This data confirms previous trends although it reduces its strength. The market serves 1.9 m members and generates €1,300 m  in premiums (close to 8% of health expenditure). The trend towards collectivization is consolidating again. Right  now close to 45% of premiums come from group insurance due to tax-breaks that only to apply to such policies.
The key question then is not regarding the growth of that market, we have to ask ourselves if such growth is in the right direction towards a more competitive and efficient market. My impression is that information asymmetries and current incentives (tax rebates) need to be rebuilt. 
Let's leave it here for today.

PS. Gary Becker on the Breakup of Countries: No Economic Disaster

PS. Carles Boix, on the role of elites.

PS. Yesterday I attended at the conference on economic and legal dimensions of independence:



PS. Extracted from Vilaweb: Message to the elites: independence is viable and inevitable
 
The Wilson Initiative at Cercle d'Economia explains the arguments for a own state
 
'The independence movement goes from bottom to top, from the street to the Circle. And the role of the elite is to provide what is inevitable. There is vibration, there is anxiety ... But we have to make an effort to allow this to happen. " This is the message that Professor Boix has sent on behalf of the Wilson Initiative to representatives of the country's economic and political elites that assembled at the Economic Circle to hear the arguments of this group of distinguished academics . They have appeared amid great excitement and deploying all arguments to show an audience traditionally reluctant to independence process, that is feasible and necessary. 
Savings of 1,800 euros per person per year
The own state is an opportunity, said Jaume Ventura, who presented figures on the balance between the cost and expense to have a state and maintain their structure.
'He says that if we want exactly replicate the structure in Spain that would cost us 383 euros per person per year. And that, assuming we want to maintain the same embassy as many guns and so on. ' This would be the cost per head, said Ventura. But, eliminating the annual fiscal deficit of Catalonia would provide € 16,000 million. 'The Catalans pay 2,251 euros per person per year in excess of contribution to Spain. After paying 100 euros in taxes, only 57 are spent in Catalonia. Why do we pay that extra money? Not because lower pensions than in Spain. The unemployment benefit is also the same. The explanation is that the deficit is not reversed in Catalonia infrastructure. We have the lowest public capital stock '
What could we do with this after saving 1,868 euros? "With a third of the money we could stop the budget cuts, with 1,868 of these would spend $ 500 to be the sixth country with more investment in education, and 550 euros per person per year, we would be the third country in Europe in investment in research and development.

Listen to Lizz Right while waiting for the next concert in Barcelona. 

The lyrics apply to the former text

Reforming NHS (once again)

 LSE–Lancet Commission on the future of the NHS: re-laying the foundations for an equitable and efficient health and care service after COVID-19

Any reforms starts with a good diagnosis, therefore it's good to check how inequality indicators differ across countries.

And these are the recommendations:

Recommendation 1: increase investment in the NHS, social care, and public health

Recommendation 2: improve resource management across health and care at national, local, and treatment levels

Recommendation 3: develop a sustainable, skilled, and inclusive health and care workforce to meet changing health and care needs

Recommendation 4: strengthen prevention of disease and disability and preparedness to protect against threats to health

Recommendation 5: improve diagnosis, in circumstances where evidence exists to support early diagnosis, for improved outcomes and reduced inequalities

Recommendation 6: develop the culture, capacity, and capabilities of the NHS and social care to become a national learning health and care system

Recommendation 7: improve integration between health, social care, and public health and across different providers, including the third sector

I

Investing heavily (2)

Global Healthcare Private Equity Report 2014

One of the adverse effects of financial repression is that investors may lose their compass in the allocation of risk and the prediction of rewards. This repression period for savers will last longer than anybody would expect, since the size of public debt in some countries is still increasing. Therefore, now it is the time for private equity to invest in sectors with greater uncertainty over profits that would be desirable in normal conditions. This is one reason, among others, why hospitals may appear of interest and this is precisely what happened yesterday.
We know from a recent report that while overall private equity investment increased, capital deployed in healthcare declined in 2013.

Investment levels in the medtech and provider sectors in Europe were down in 2013 compared with 2012, when these sectors saw three $1 billion-plus deals between them. Deal value in the provider sector was especially slow, coming in at only a third of the level seen in 2012, partially due to the dearth of large deals like the previous year’s Mediq (a pharmacy distributor) and Four Seasons (nursing homes) deals.

In 2014 the trend could be the opposite, at least near here. The closed operation (1$ billion-plus) will change the landscape of private health care for decades, and some shocks may appear sooner than later. Let's wait for the strategic responses.

PS. It may seem a paradox, but the unintended effect of financial repression by governments is a misperception of risk. Speculative bubbles before the recession have had the same effect. Beware of that.

PS. Regarding yesterday's case, I understand that antitrust issues will be taken into account properly...

Can capitalism be reimagined? (4)

Rethinking Capitalism lectures

From UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose;

Western Capitalism is in crisis, with falling productivity, investment and living standards, widening inequality, financial instability and the growing threat of climate change. This undergraduate module provides students with a critical perspective on these ‘grand-challenges’ and introduces them to new approaches to economics and policy which challenge standard thinking.
The module draws on the book “Rethinking Capitalism”, edited by Mariana Mazzucato (Director of IIPP) and Michael Jacobs (Visiting fellow in the UCL School of Public Policy). It features guest academic lectures from some of the chapter authors which can be viewed below. These academic lectures are combined with presentations by policy makers working at the frontline of the issues under discussion

Què hem de fer?

Using Market-Exclusivity Incentives to Promote Pharmaceutical Innovation

Sabem que la indústria farmacèutica investiga, però també que els medicaments que s'aproven cada vegada són menys, i generen més controvèrsia. Aquest article del NEJM ens diu el que s¡ha fet en termes d'incentius per a promoure la recerca i els dubtes raonables sobre el que s'ha assolit. Conclusió:

Although use of market-exclusivity incentives to promote pharmaceutical innovation has potential benefits, future legislative efforts aimed at encouraging investment in drug research and development should be more precisely designed to avoid waste and misuse, and they should be linked to demonstration of positive public health outcomes. Without these limitations, making exclusivity incentives available to pharmaceutical manufacturers may not be worth the potential risks to public health.

Extendre el termini de la patent pot ser contraproduent. Cal evitar el malbaratament. I això es relaciona amb el que deia fa uns dies, massa incentius provoquen que els errors els paguem molt cars.

Ps. Record de Juan Gris a Christie's 28m de $

Pharma confidential (5)

Avui torno a parlar de preus confidencials dels medicaments perquè crec que aquest tema està sortint de mare. Veig a alguns una mica exaltats davant la possibilitat que hi hagi una resolució judicial definitiva a la transparència de preus, i tot això coincideix amb el lobby engreixant l'engranatge acadèmic que es deixa engreixar.

Publicar un presumpte article científic a una revista amb revisió no és cap garantia d'objectivitat ni imparcialitat, explicar els conflictes d'interès ajuda a comprendre perquè s'arriba a les conclusions. Si la revista no té cap política que mostri quin ha estat el finançament de l'article i els conflictes d'interès dels seus participants, aleshores ja hi ha motiu raonable per dubtar del seu contingut.

M'ha arribat un article que justifica l'opacitat de preus dels medicaments i ho fa amb uns arguments retorçats adhoc. Arriben a la conclusió de que la transparència dels medicaments seria inviable, després d'haver dissenyat una simulació específicament per arribar a aquesta conclusió, un applaus!!!,. Alhora explica que cauria una plaga bíblica que faria retardar l'accés als medicaments a aquells països que els fessin públics. 

Quan m'ho miro dues vegades veig que l'article té l'origen a una consultora, en un projecte pagat per una empresa farmacèutica. I ja hem arribat al final de l'afer. L'acadèmia pot arribar a la conclusió que el finançador vulgui o no, però si no s'expliciten els conflictes d'interès, hi ha motius sobrats per decantar les opinions. I dic opinions perquè una simulació, no té objectivitat, depèn de quines hipòtesis fas i la seva credibilitat, i les hipòtesis en aquest cas no són neutres. Són prefabricades per arribar a la conclusió que vol el finançador.

Em sap molt de greu per com queda tocada una determinada "acadèmia" i alguns economistes de la salut. Malauradament, aquest comentari d'avui quedarà en el sac de tants altres comentaris sobre la necessària objectivitat i imparcialitat de la ciència.

L'informe de l'OCDE en canvi, diu clarament:

There was substantial disagreement among the experts consulted on how greater transparency could impact the functioning of markets. Some were confident that greater price transparency could render significant benefits, namely stronger bargaining power for public payers in price negotiations with industry, greater public accountability and legitimacy of coverage decisions. Others saw greater price transparency as introducing new risks to the functioning of markets, for example, through price convergence, with the potential for higher prices and/or reduced patient access in countries with lesser ability to pay, unclear effects on differential pricing and parallel trade, and uncertain consequences for long term commercial decisions regarding both market participation and investment in R&D. Neither perspective is supported by the existing evidence, arguably suggesting a need for caution in moving the agenda forward.

Per tant, el pensament socràtic s'imposa, només sabem que no sabem res. 

Afegeixo, no ho veureu a l'article citat, la transparència de preus és un mecanisme per anul·lar l'impacte de la regulació mitjançant preus de referència, i alhora eliminar l'impacte de l'avaluació econòmica feta amb preus reals. Ses dues bísties a abatre en un mateix tret segons alguns.

 PS. Quan la política sanitària no la fas, te la fan. Avís per a navegants. Els jutges acabaran definint la política farmacèutica.

Literatura d'alta volada

Jordi Sàbat