Stimulating ideas for drug development and pricing

New Health Technologies. Managing Access, Value and Sustainability

This new OECD report sheds light over several issues in an heterogeneous way, but the pharma chapter has a box that I want to highlight. It is really suggestive:

Future scenarios about drug development and drug pricing

These disruptive scenarios result from an expert consultation led by ShiftN and commissioned by the Belgian Health Care Knowledge Centre of Expertise and the Dutch Health Care Institute. The aim of the consultation was to imagine disruptive ways to finance R&D that could potentially better respond to public health needs.

Scenario 1: Needs-oriented Public-Private Partnerships
Public actors and drug developers are tackling public health priorities in vigorous and pragmatic partnerships. The public actor identifies indications representing high public health needs; specifies criteria for the performance levels of drugs to be developed for those indications; and indicates his willingness to pay. Through procurements with enforceable contractual commitments, the public actor enters into a partnership with drug developers to
find solutions for these needs. Developers are prepared to enter into the partnership and to give price concessions for a pre-negotiated fixed agreement on price and volume, and speedier access to market, which reduces their development risk. This drug development and pricing model is close to existing governmental procurement practices in researchintensive areas such as public transport, defence and space exploration.

Scenario 2: Parallel Drug Development Track
EU member states set up a parallel, not-for-profit drug development track that exists alongside, but independent of, the pharmaceutical and biotechnological industry. The aim of the parallel track is to develop cheaper drugs without compromising safety and effectiveness. After having made up an inventory of the public health gaps and priorities in health care, EU member state authorities ask leading public research institutes which
discoveries, assets, tools and capabilities they possess to develop solutions addressing (some of) the needs that were identified. Starting from the match between demand and available expertise, coalitions are built between these (not-for-profit) research institutes, payers, authorities and patients’ organisations. All these partners make the commitment to participate in an open and transparent way in clinical research projects. Intellectual
property (IP) rights are acquired early on in the development process by the partners of the consortium, and ownership is shared. Alternatively, the parallel research infrastructure can completely deprioritise ownership; i.e. inventions and developments in the parallel track are not protected and are in the public domain.

Scenario 3: Pay for Patents
A consortium of European countries join forces and establish a “Public Fund for Affordable Drugs”. Each of the participating countries deposits a fixed annual percentage of what it currently spends on drugs into the Fund. Private payers (including insurance companies) can also join the Fund. The Fund continuously screens the research market for “interesting” drugs that are being developed in Phase II or in Phase III for indications with clear health priorities. The Fund buys the patent from developers, conducts or commissions the last phases of research in public research institutes or subcontracts to private partners (with strict public oversight), and guides the submission process for market authorisation. Because the drug is then put on the market at a relatively low price, substantial savings are generated for the public payer. Once the system is functioning “at cruising speed”, these
savings can (partly) serve to replenish the Fund. The “Pay for Patents” model delinks R&D from manufacturing and sales. The prices decrease because the partners in the Fund consider medicines as public goods that should not be financed through monopoly prices.
Hence, once the patent is owned by the public sector, after a successful development and authorisation trajectory, the rights to produce, distribute and sell the drug can be licenced to manufacturers and distributors that provide the best deal in terms of quality, safety and accessibility for the lowest cost. As a rule, various private partners compete with each other, with the result that “new drugs enter the market at generic prices”.

Scenario 4: Public Good from A to Z
Drug development is essentially a public enterprise, and is radically re-oriented from serving private profits towards serving the public interest and patients’ needs. In a drug development system that is essentially a public enterprise, private drug companies still have a role, albeit with a completely different business model. They mainly manufacture drugs and deliver services to the public provider on a competitive basis. With drugs and other health technologies essentially public goods, patents and monopolistic prices have no role.
Patients and public health providers, not corporations, choose which unmet needs research should address. Public authorities regularly publish lists of research priorities, based on objectively established and patient-informed unmet medical needs. Governments organise and fund that research through a variety of mechanisms, including requests for proposals based on well-defined targets that any research team, public or private, can compete for, or milestone compensation, and active management of the innovation process. By paying directly for R&D and active management of the drug development pipeline, nations and health care systems pay much less than the patent-protected prices of the past. Ultimately, drug prices are set on the basis of the real costs of manufacturing, quality control and distribution, which are decoupled from R&D.
Source: Vandenbroeck, Ph. et al. (2016), “Future Scenarios About Drug Development and Drug Pricing”, Health Care Knowledge Centre (KCE) Report 271, D/2016/10.273/59, Health Services Research (HSR), Brussels.

Are Pharmaceutical Companies Earning Too Much?

Are Pharmaceutical Companies Earning Too Much?

Estimated Research and Development Investment Needed to Bring a New Medicine to Market, 2009-2018

The debate about pharmaceutical companies earnings is a never ending story. Now you can find in JAMA an article that reflects the cost of a new drug: $1336 million. This is the summary:

The FDA approved 355 new drugs and biologics over the study period. Research and development expenditures were available for 63 (18%) products, developed by 47 different companies. After accounting for the costs of failed trials, the median capitalized research and development investment to bring a new drug to market was estimated at $985.3 million (95% CI, $683.6 million-$1228.9 million), and the mean investment was estimated at $1335.9 million (95% CI, $1042.5 million-$1637.5 million) in the base case analysis. Median estimates by therapeutic area (for areas with ≥5 drugs) ranged from $765.9 million (95% CI, $323.0 million-$1473.5 million) for nervous system agents to $2771.6 million (95% CI, $2051.8 million-$5366.2 million) for antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents.

Why this new figure is relevant? Because previous estimates said that it was the more than the double!

The mean estimate of $1.3 billion in the present study was lower than the $2.8 billion (in 2018 US dollars) reported by DiMasi et al,

And   my impression is that we have entered in a difficult world to estimate the real cost. Right now many firms are buying research (buying firms that have already a product close to be commercialised) and they are paying a premium for outsourcing research. Therefore, how to estimate the cost in this situations? Uncertain.

David Cutler asks about the earnings of pharma firms and says:

Ledley showed that from 2000 to 2018, the median net income margin in the pharmaceutical industry was 13.8% annually, compared with 7.7% in the S&P 500  sample. This difference was statistically significant, even with controls, although earnings seemed to be declining over time.

Is this positive return differential evidence of too high a return? Not necessarily. The economics of pharmaceuticals are important to consider. Like several other industries (eg, software and motion picture production), the pharmaceutical industry has very high fixed cost and very low marginal cost. It takes substantial investment to discover a drug or develop a complex computer code, but the cost of producing an extra pill or allowing an extra download is minimal. The way that firms recoup these fixed costs is by charging above cost for the product once it is made. If these upfront costs are not accounted for, the return on the marketed good will look very high.

 Paying more than a drug is worth clinically is not a good strategy. Even if a drug is worth a high price socially, pricing patients who need the drug out of the market is a real loss, even if it leads to more innovation in the future. In still another case, price increases for older, generic drugs serve no innovation purpose. But, as a general rule, it is important to be wary of blunt “lower all drug prices” policies.

Cutler doesn't say too much on price according value and about public funding of research. It leaves the initial question open and waiting for adhoc answers. That's it , it's a complicated issue, no general prescriptions, they need to be adjusted to specific conditions without a captured regulator. This last point is the most difficult one to overcome.

Prix Pictet

Pharma, big pharma (17)

 Big Pharma. The Money Behind the Pills

Contents:

Chapter 1

Big Pharma’s New Deal: Acquisition and Little Innovation

Blockbuster Drugs Are So Last Century BY ALEX BERENSON

When Academia Puts Profit Ahead of Wonder BY JANET RAE-DUPREE

Grant System Leads Cancer Researchers to Play It Safe BY GINA KOLATA

Are Doctors Too Wary of Drug Companies? BY PAULINE W. CHEN, M.D.

Valeant’s History of Deal-Making BY WILLIAM ALDEN

Roche to Buy InterMune for $8.3 Billion BY ANDREW POLLACK AND MICHAEL J. DE LA MERCED

Why Are So Few Blockbuster Drugs Invented Today? BY DAN HURLEY

$2.6 Billion to Develop a Drug? New Estimate Makes Questionable Assumptions BY AARON E. CARROLL

Stop Subsidizing Big Pharma BY LLEWELLYN HINKES-JONES

Ways to Fund Research on Rare Diseases THE NEW YORK TIMES

AstraZeneca to Acquire Majority Stake in Acerta Pharma BY CHAD BRAY

Explaining Valeant: The Main Theories BY STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON

Chapter 2

Monopolies and Exclusivity Drive Price Spikes

Runaway Drug Prices BY THE NEW YORK TIMES

Costly Hepatitis C Drugs for Everyone? BY THE NEW YORK TIMES

New Cholesterol Drugs Are Vastly Overpriced, Analysis Says BY ANDREW POLLACK

Inflated Drug Prices THE NEW YORK TIMES

Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight BY ANDREW POLLACK

Big Price Increase for Tuberculosis Drug Is Rescinded BY ANDREW POLLACK

Valeant Under Investigation for Its Drug Pricing Practices BY ANDREW POLLACK

Senators Condemn Big Price Increases for Drugs BY ANDREW POLLACK

No Justification for High Drug Prices BY THE NEW YORK TIMES

Another Drug Pricing Ripoff BY THE NEW YORK TIMES

The EpiPen, a Case Study in Health System Dysfunction BY AARON E. CARROLL

The Complex Math Behind Spiraling Prescription Drug Prices BY KATIE THOMAS

The Lesson of EpiPens: Why Drug Prices Spike, Again and Again BY ELISABETH ROSENTHAL

Chapter 3

Disease Branding and the Profusion of Diagnoses

Ritalin Wars BY JUDITH WARNER

Disease Branding BY BEN SCHOTT

Still the ‘Age of Anxiety.’ Or Is It? BY DANIEL SMITH

Ruling Is Victory for Drug Companies in Promoting Medicine for Other Uses BY KATIE THOMAS

A.D.H.D. Seen in 11% of U.S. Children as Diagnoses Rise BY ALAN SCHWARZ AND SARAH COHEN

Is It Really A.D.H.D. or Just Immaturity? BY KJ DELL’ANTONIA

Overselling A.D.H.D.: A New Book Exposes Big Pharma’s Role BY STEVE SILBERMAN

A Profusion of Diagnoses. That’s Good and Bad. BY DHRUV KHULLAR, M.D.

Chapter 4

The Money Behind Epidemics: Preventing, Treating and Healing

For Profit, Industry Seeks Cancer Drugs BY ANDREW POLLACK

F.D.A. Advisory Panel Backs Preventive Use of H.I.V. Drug BY DENISE GRADY

Advocating Pill, U.S. Signals Shift to Prevent AIDS BY DONALD G. MCNEIL JR.

Painkillers Resist Abuse, but Experts Still Worry BY ALAN SCHWARZ

The C.E.O. of H.I.V. BY CHRISTOPHER GLAZEK

The Insanity of Taxpayer-Funded Addiction BY THE NEW YORK TIMES

F.D.A. to Expand Medication-Assisted Therapy for Opioid Addicts BY SHEILA KAPLAN

As Opioid Prescriptions Fall, Prescriptions for Drugs to Treat Addiction Rise BY ABBY GOODNOUGH

Chapter 5

The Trump Administration vs. Big Pharma

The Real Reason Medicare Is a Lousy Drug Negotiator: It Can’t Say No BY MARGOT SANGER-KATZ

The Fight Trump Faces Over Drug Prices BY KATIE THOMAS

Trump Vows to Ease Rules for Drug Makers, but Again Zeros In on Prices BY KATIE THOMAS

Drug Lobbyists’ Battle Cry Over Prices: Blame the Others BY ERIC LIPTON AND KATIE THOMAS

Draft Order on Drug Prices Proposes Easing Regulations BY SHEILA KAPLAN AND KATIE THOMAS

Lower Drug Prices: New Proposals Carry Lots of Promises BY KATIE THOMAS AND REED ABELSON

What Big Pharma Fears Most: A Trump Alliance With Democrats to Cut Drug Prices BY ROBERT PEAR

Trump Proposes to Lower Drug Prices by Basing Them on Other Countries’ Costs BY ROBERT PEAR

Drug pricing 101 (2)

The New Drug Reimbursement Game. A Regulator’s Guide to Playing and Winning

In my former post I was backing a complete review of current drug pricing regulation. Any official that has to perform this task needs some fresh ideas and knowledge and this is precisely what a new book provides. In The New Drug Reimbursement Game by Brita A.K. Pekarsky you'll find the economic foundations for a new drug pricing regulation.
The basic argument:

Higher prices today mean increased economic rent for the pharmaceutical industry (Pharma) otherwise firms would not lobby for them. It is in Pharma’s interest to protect and seek these economic rents. Whether higher prices and more R&D today increase future health remains an empirical question. If higher prices also mean a higher net present value of the population’s health, then it is in the institution’s interest to increase prices. Given the institution’s objectives, the most effective strategy Pharma can use to protect these rents is “the Threat”: lowering prices is against the interest of health funders because it will reduce a population’s future health.

Therefore,

 The regulator’s challenge is to answer the following question:
• “How should rational institutions respond to the Threat?” (A rational response is one that is consistent with a given institution’s stated objective function, whatever this may be.)
This introduction places this research question in the context of current evidence and research, by addressing the following three questions.
• Is it plausible that the Threat exists and that it influences the price of new drugs?
• Is there rigorous empirical evidence that suggests that lower drug prices will result in reduced future health?
• Are economists in agreement as to the value of a decision threshold for new  drugs that accommodates characteristics of the health budget such as allocative and technical inefficiency?

And the conclusion:

When the Institution buys this new drug, it buys the health effects from this drug and the health benefits from future innovation. This is not the case with other health programmes. Therefore, unless the Institution pays a premium for the health effects from the new drug, the population will be worse off because innovation will be suboptimal and the future drug will not be produced.

Unfortunately, when you get to the end you'll miss any consideration about what innovation means. If you look at recent patterns of effectiveness of new drugs, you'll see that the value of innovation is under scrutiny, and most drugs would not pass the test. In my opinion, the regulator has to send signals about the value of health improvement in certain diseases and pharmaceutical companies should focus R+D on such fields and avoid others.
Therefore, a new companion to this book should be written. This is only a regulator's guide to play, but not to win. Take it only as a starting point.

PS. Just FYI, you'll not find the term "Budget impact analysis"  in the book, a close term Programme budgeting marginal analysis PBMA is what you'll find. It is suggested a price effectiveness analysis as a previous requirement for any PBMA, otherwise it makes no sense. This approach seems quite different to  yesterday's news.

Thomas Piketty speech at UPF Oct 2014, it starts at min 8:10. My post, last May.

Public funding of succesful Pharma R&D

Contribution of NIH funding to new drug approvals 2010–2016

If we consider the 210 new molecular entities (NMEs) approved by the Food and Drug Administration from 2010–2016, then you'll find that NIH funding contributed to published research associated with every one. A PNAS article explains that:

Collectively, this research involved 200,000 years of grant funding totaling more than $100 billion. The analysis shows that 90% of this funding represents basic research related to the biological targets for drug action rather than the drugs themselves. The role of NIH funding thus complements industry research and development, which focuses predominantly on applied research. This work underscores the breath and significance
of public investment in the development of new therapeutics and the risk that reduced research funding would slow the pipeline for treating morbid disease.

This public funding is forgotten in the costs of a new molecule. Although in the price, the manufacturer surplus doesn't remunerate such contribution. Some adjustment should be applied, to be fair.

 Brassai at Mapfre Foundation in Barcelona

Pharma, Big Pharma (2)

 Government, Big Pharma, and The People. A Century of Dis-Ease

A book to read, with this Table of Contents:

Dedication
Acknowledgements
Preface
Chapter One – Introductions
Health
Woman as a Biological and Social Entity
A Different Paradigm
Health Care and Rights
Drugs and Their Role in Society
Drug Policy
Big Pharma
Drug-Related Problems
The People
What’s Ahead
Conclusion
Chapter Two – The Four "P’s"
Introduction
Marketing as an Actualizing Process
The Marketing Mix/The Four "P’s"
Government and the Four "P’s"
Conclusion
Chapter Three – Investigators and Investigations
Introduction
The Hearings
The Grand Inquisitor
Gaylord Nelson – Son of Torquemada
The Fountain Hearings
Senator Kennedy Joins the Fray
Small Business Problems – Dingell
Drug Efficacy Problems – Fountain
Moss on Drug Abuse
Fountain Redux
Congressman Rogers on Transition
Senator Humphrey and the Literature
A Newcomer – Congressman Van Deerlin
Senator Fountain – "One More Time"
Senator Kennedy Returns
FDA Under the Microscope Again
Kennedy – Not Too Tranquil
Gore on Pharmaceutical R & D
Senator Fountain Again
Claude Pepper for the Old Folks
Zomax in the Spotlight
A Pryor Engatement
The Task Force on Prescription Drugs
Research Findings and Recommendations
Conclusion
Chapter Four – Legislators and Legislation
Introduction
Laws and Policy
Bills and Sponsors
The Process
Conclusion
Chapter Five – Regulators and Regulations
Introduction
The Food and Drug Administration
Other Regulators and Regulations
Federal Trade Commission
Federal Communications Commission
Drug Enforcement Administration
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Patents and Trademarks
State Regulations
Drug Names
Conclusion
Chapter Six – Non-Government Influence
Introduction
Self-Regulation
Third Parties – Managed Care Controls
Formularies and Prescription Limitations
Lawyers
Advocates and Adversaries
Mail Order Pharmacy
Pharmacy Benefit Managers and Outcomes Management
Conclusion
Chapter Seven – The People and Their Drugs
Introduction
The People as Patients
Health Belief Model
Case – Health Belief Model
Attitudes and Evaluation of Drugs
The Sickness Career
The Sick Role
The Sick Role in Acute and Chronic Illness
Compliance with Medication Regimens
Other Influences on Medication Use
What to Do
Death or Maybe Not
Conclusion
Chapter Eight – Response of Big Pharma
Introduction
Response to Government
Big Pharma Speaks
Response of Big Pharma to the People
Some Ideas for Big Pharma
PMA Monographs
Statesmanship
Conclusion
Chapter Nine – Little Pharma and Friends
Introduction
Generic Pharma – Not So Little
Big Bio
What is Special about Specialty Drugs?
Little Boutiques
Back to the Future – Compounding Pharmacists
Friends
Conclusion
Chapter Ten – Greedy Big Pharma
Introduction
Two Parts of Greedy
AARP and Greedy Big Pharma
Congress and Greedy Big Pharma
Risk vs. Reward
Greedy Big Tech
Conclusion
Chapter Eleven – Whence the Drugs?
Introduction
Origins of Drugs
Drug Product Development
Marketing in the Last Century
Invention, Discovery, Development
Curiosities and Surprises
Recommended Reading
Conclusion
Chapter Twelve – Drugs of the Future
Introduction
But Seriously
Drugs in an Aging Society
Future Drugs for the Aged
Lifestyle Drugs
Conclusion
Chapter Thirteen – The Non-Prescription Products Market-Dr. W. Steven Pray
Introduction
Patent Medicines
Laws That Regulated Non-Prescription Products
FDA’s Review of O-T-C Products
The Prescription to O-T-C Switch
A Third Class of Drugs
Quackery – Lacking Proof of Efficacy
Quackery – New Names Confer False Respectability
Conclusion
Chapter Fourteen – Issues and Studies in Pharmacoeconomics
Introduction
The Emergence of Pharmacoeconomic Research
The Cost of Illness
Quality of Life Assessment
The Economics of Non-Compliance
Economic Epidemiology
Conclusion
Chapter Fifteen – On Drug Prices – Dr. E. M. "Mick" Kolassa
Pricing: The Forgotten "P"
The Growing Importance of Pharmaceutical Prices
Prices, Politics and Problems
Pricing Terminology
What is a Pharmaceutical Price?
Price Decision Making
The Value of Pharmaceuticals
The Future of Pharmaceutical Pricing
Chapter Sixteen – Summary, Ruminations and Apologia
Introduction
Ruminations
Trends
What If’s
Apologia

Fugues

Federal Taxation of the Drug Industry and Effects on New Drug Development

El món està trasbalsat per Wikileaks, i això ja fa temps que dura. A més no estan sols. Si algú vol saber per exemple la fiscalitat real de la indústria farmacèutica, pot consultar-ho aquí. La gent d'Open CRS publiquen informes d'interès que no arribarien al gran públic.
Pel que fa a la fiscalitat farmacèutica nordamericana, encara que semblaria que la taxa mitjana és equivalent a d'altres sectors, no és pas així. Destaco un paràgraf:

A comparison of average effective federal tax rates for the drug industry and major U.S. industries indicates that the share of the drug industry’s worldwide net income paid as federal taxes was similar to the average share for all industries from 2000 through 2006. This has not always been the case. For much of the 1990s, the drug industry’s tax burden was significantly lower than the average tax burden for all industries. But starting in the late 1990s, the drug industry’s federal tax burden began to rise as the U.S. possessions tax credit was phased out. Drug firms were major beneficiaries of this credit. They also appear to benefit substantially, if not disproportionately, from three tax preferences whose combined effect is not fully reflected in average tax rates: (1) the deferral of federal income tax on the retained earnings of foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-based corporations, (2) the expensing of research outlays, and (3) the expensing of advertising outlays.

Si voleu saber el detall de l'evasió fiscal legal, el trobareu a la secció: "Transfer of Intangible Assets Like Drug Patents to Low-Tax Countries". Fort.

PS. Lectura necessària, Manuel Castells a La Vanguardia avui. La frase clau:

Como documenté en mi libro Comunicación y poder, el poder reside en el control de la comunicación. La reacción histérica de EE.UU. y otros gobiernos contra Wikileaks lo confirma. Entramos en una nueva fase de la comunicación política. No tanto porque se revelen secretos o cotilleos como porque se difunden por un canal que escapa a los aparatos de poder

 PS. Lectura imprescindible. NYT i el blog GCS 

 

L'equació fonamental de la hidroestàtica i els preus dels medicaments

The White House’s Latest Move to Rein in Drug Prices

Llegeixo a Time que el govern americà finança cada any 100 mil milions de $ en recerca i desenvolupament, i que un bon tros va cap a la indústria farmacèutica. I resulta que el president Biden s'ha adonat que hi ha una llei, la  Bayh–Dole Act, que diu que si una organització empresarial rep finançament del govern federal per desenvolupar un nou producte, el govern dels Estats Units té el dret de "participar" i controlar a qui llicencia el producte. En el cas de les companyies farmacèutiques, això vol dir que el govern pot donar la llicència per fabricar un medicament protegit per patent a una empresa genèrica, fent baixar significativament el preu del medicament. 

El tema fa temps que cueja, recordeu el preu de les vacunes COVID i la investigació pública en recerca, en vaig parlar fa dies. Llavors es va argumentar que els ciutadans nordamericans estaven pagant dues vegades, per una banda la recerca i alhora el preu de la vacuna. Ara el president s'ha adonat que hi ha una llei de 1980, que des de fa 43 anys permet llicenciar una patent quan hi ha hagut finançament públic.

Com funcionaria això? Doncs cal llegir el que diu la Casa Blanca en el seu informe. Primer parla de l'impacte de la concentració de mercat i com afecta el preu:

New research released by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) finds that a lack of competition in drug markets is highly correlated with higher prices. Among the highest priced drugs (i.e., those in the top 10% of price per prescription), 89% of small molecule drugs and 100% of biological products had only one manufacturer. Meanwhile, nearly three in ten individuals struggle to pay for the drugs they need.

 I després assenyala un conjunt de mesures raonables i clares. En destaco la relativa als preus:

Negotiating and lowering drug prices. Thanks to President Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, the Administration has announced 10 prescription drugs for which Medicare will negotiate prices directly with participating manufacturers. These drugs cost people with Medicare $3.4 billion out of pocket in 2022. This builds on other progress to lower prescription drug costs. Individuals with Medicare can now receive certain vaccines for free under the President’s lower cost prescription drug law, which previously would have cost an average of $70 in out-of-pocket costs. The Inflation Reduction Act also capped the cost of insulin at $35 per product per month for almost four million seniors and others on Medicare with diabetes, which can lead to hundreds of dollars in savings for a month’s supply.

Per llei fins fa poc el govern no podia negociar preus, però la Inflation Act ho va canviar i ara com a gran cosa en negociaran 10 només, però són dels més importants. Alhora que assenyalen un camí nou, el de preus màxims. Convé recordar que el 45% del finançament dels medicaments és públic, i la despesa farmacèutica total és de 348 mil milions de $.

Definitivament, si tot això passa serà un canvi radical a la política farmacèutica nordamericana, que farà trontollar arreu, també a Europa. I és que això significa una erosió de benefici allà on el marge és més gran i cercaran formes de compensar-ho, per allò dels vasos comunicants, l'equació fonamental de la hidroestàtica. La pressió per augmentar els marges serà superior a Europa, si s'erosionen els beneficis als USA, i els preus a Europa poden augmentar. El regulador hauria d'estar atent i ser proactiu davant d'aquest nou escenari ben possible.

PS. Nota del dia. Imagineu un Estat que ha decidit posar un impost i dins hi ha un país que hi viu el 16% de la població. El 41% dels contribuents que paga aquest impost és d'aquest petit país, i el 44% dels ingressos també ho són. Hi ha 88.781 contribuents que han llepat i paguen 7.112 euros de mitjana. I després diuen en aquell Estat que som iguals davant la llei i que aquesta repressió fiscal és legal i no es pot fugir-ne, malgrat que tothom ja sap que marxar tant aviat com es pugui és l'única opció.

The profits of opioid addiction epidemic

 American Overdose. The Opioid Tragedy in Three Acts

Formerly in this blog you may have read about opioid epidemics. In the US is a great social and public health tragedy. If you want some details about fentanil consumption in Catalonia, check this report (p.153-155).

In the book America overdose, you'll find an exceelent description about what has happened in US in practical terms. Wirtten by a journalist from The guardian, it may help any public health official of any country to understand the huge danger we have to confront. The starting point for McGreal’s deeply reported investigation is the miners promised that opioid painkillers would restore their wrecked bodies, but who became targets of “drug dealers in white coats.” And says (in chapter 21):

It would be a mistake to conclude that responsibility for the opioid epidemic lies only with the greed of the drug companies or that it is shared solely with corrupt doctors and pharmacists who profited from mass prescribing. They were facilitated by politicians, regulators, and a broader medical industry with an agenda or that chose not to see. The opioid makers were helped in that because, for many years, the primary victims were those it was easy to look away from—the “dumbass hillbillies,” as Willis Duncan put it.

Purdue may have targeted some of the poorest parts of Appalachia because that’s where the data said opioids were already being prescribed. But it proved a convenience that these regions were among the most marginalized in the country and the easiest to stigmatize as the drug makers pursued the disreputable tactic of blaming the victims for their addiction.

Like the nineteenth-century opium dealers, the painkiller manufacturers used the power of the huge profits of addiction to keep the faucets of mass prescribing open. The quarter of a billion dollars a year the drug industry spends on lobbying bought the complicity of Congress and organizations such as the American Medical Association through silence and distraction. The din of money drowned out the warnings sounded by Dr. Art Van Zee about the devastation already wrought to his Virginia community in the late 1990s and the research by doctors such as Jane Ballantyne that should have prompted critical questioning of the claims made for opioids. Congress and the FDA were told loudly and clearly that a national disaster was unfolding more than a decade before the CDC’s Tom Frieden called it an epidemic.

Drawing on the tobacco companies’ playbook, opioid manufacturers obscured the evidence of the dangers of their products even when it was staring the industry in the face. Instead, the drug makers and their front organizations sought to discredit those who advocated caution.

 

Els medicaments que venen i els que ja s'han aprovat el 2023

És bo fer una ullada a quins són els medicaments que previsiblement s'aprovaran l'any 2024, i els de Nature diuen que són aquests:

Medicaments per aprovar el 2024

Biologic name	Sponsor	Properties	Indication	Timing
Zolbetuximab	Astellas	Claudin 18.2-targeted mAb	Gastric cancer	January
Lifileucel	Iovance	Tumour-infiltrating lymphocyte therapy	Melanoma	February
Resmetiroma	Madrigal/Synta	Thyroid hormone receptor β agonist	NASH	March
Sotatercepta	Merck & Co./Acceleron	Fusion protein ligand trap for TGF-β superfamily	PAH	March
mRNA-1345a	Moderna	mRNA-based vaccine	RSV prevention	April
Donanemaba	Eli Lilly	Amyloid-β-targeted mAb	Alzheimer disease	Q1
EB-101a	Abeona	Gene therapy with COL7A2 transgene	RDEB	May
Patritumab deruxtecana	Merck & Co.	HER3-targeted ADC	NSCLC	June
Imetelstat	Geron	Telomerase inhibitor	Transfusion-dependent anaemia with MDS	June
Tarlatamaba	Amgen	DLL3 × CD3 T-cell engager antibody	SCLC	June
Fidanacogene elaparvoveca	Pfizer/Spark	AAV-based gene therapy with factor IX transgene	Hemophilia B	Q2
Bentracimaba	Laboratoires SERB	Ticagrelor-neutralizing antibody	Drug toxicity	1H
Crovalimaba	Roche	C5-targeted mAb	PNH	July
Danicopana	AstraZeneca/Alexion	Factor D inhibitor	PNH	July
Midomafetaminea	MAPS	MDMA	PTSD	August
Xanomeline plus trospium	Karuna/BMS	Muscarinic receptor modulators	Schizophrenia	September
Acoramidis	BridgeBio	TTR stabilizer	TTR amyloidosis	December
Marstacimab	Pfizer	TFPI-targeted mAb	Haemophilia A and B	Q4
Afamitresgene autoleucela	Adaptimmune	MAGE-A4-targeted autologous, engineered T cell therapy	Synovial sarcoma	2024

aBreakthrough designated drug. AAV, adeno-associated virus; ADC, antibody–drug conjugate; mAb, monoclonal antibody; MDS, myelodysplastic syndromes; NASH, non-alcoholic steatohepatitis; NSCLC, non-small-cell lung cancer; PAH, pulmonary arterial hypertension; PNH, paroxysmal nocturnal haemoglobinuria; PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder; RDEB, recessive dystrophic epidermolysis bullosa; RSV, respiratory syncytial virus; SCLC, small-cell lung cancer; TFPI, tissue factor pathway inhibitor; TTR, transthyretin. Source: BioMedTracker and press releases.

També és bo de veure què ha passat amb l'aprovació de medicaments per la FDA el 2023 i resulta que s'ha arribat a 55 nous medicaments, una xifra considerable si observem el que passava els anys anteriors, només superada el 2018

Fig. 1 | 30 years of novel FDA approvals. Annual numbers of new molecular entities (NMEs) and biologics license applications (BLAs) approved by the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER). See Table 1 for new approvals in 2023. Products approved by the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER), including vaccines and gene therapies, are not included in this drug count (Table 2). Source: FDA.

Fig. 2 | CDER approvals by therapeutic area. Indications that span multiple therapeutic areas are classified under only one, based on which FDA office and division reviewed the approval application. Sources: Nature Reviews Drug Discovery, FDA.

Fig. 3 | CDER approvals by modality. Small molecules, including peptides of up to 40 amino acids in length, and oligonucleotides are approved as new molecular entities (NMEs). Protein-based candidates are approved through biologics license applications (BLAs). mAb, monoclonal antibody; siRNA, small interfering RNA. Source: Nature Reviews Drug Discovery.

I la notícia de l'any ha estat CRISPR:

Vertex and CRISPR Therapeutics’ exagamglogene autotemcel (exa-cel; Casgevy) especially is the first CRISPR–Cas9-based gene editor to secure a green light from the FDA, winning an approval for sickle cell disease (SCD). Exa-cel is an ex vivo gene-edited cell therapy: blood cells are harvested from patients, genetically modified at the BCL11a transcription factor to re-enable fetal haemoglobin production, and then re-infused into patients. The therapeutically upregulated fetal haemoglobin compensates for the defects in β-haemoglobin that cause the diseases. Clinical data shows that the gene therapy has curative potential, although longer-term data are needed to assess the durability of the effect.

When Harvard Medical School and HHMI’s Stuart Orkin and colleagues discovered the role of BCL11a in fetal haemoglobin production in 2008, it was unclear how to drug the transcription factor. The arrival of CRISPR–Cas9 gene-editing system in 2012 provided a path forward for haemoglobinopathies. The development of the programme was “remarkably fast”, said Orkin. “It is a perfect example of how the ecosystem can work.”

Vertex and CRISPR have priced the one-off treatment at $2.2 million. It also requires a harsh preconditioning chemotherapy regimen, to make room for the edited cells. The therapy will consequently remain out of reach for many patients. “This is not the end game,” says Orkin, who has his eye on next-generation gene editors and small molecules that might be more accessible.

PS. Un breu missatge per aquells que mitjançant la seva recerca "obren la porta" a tractaments i ho expliquen al Telenotícies. No n'hi ha cap d'aquesta llista del 2024 ni del 2023 d'aquí sota que sigui un d'ells, la porta segueix oberta, o potser no hi havia porta per obrir. Millor no haver d'estar sentint això sempre, sense explicar-ne el resultat.

PS. La història de exa-cel.

PS. The economist sobre el tema

PS. El llistat de medicaments:

Table 1 | CDER approvals in 2023

Drug (brand name)	Sponsor	Properties	Indication
Lecanemab (Leqembi)a	Eisai/Biogen	Amyloid-β-targeted mAb	Alzheimer disease
Bexagliflozin (Brenzavvy)	Theracosbio	SGLT2 inhibitor	Glycaemic control in type 2 diabetes mellitus
Pirtobrutinib (Jaypirca)	Loxo/Eli Lilly	BTK inhibitor	Mantle cell lymphoma
Elacestrant (Orserdu)	Stemline	ER antagonist	ER-positive, HER2-negative, ESR1-mutant breast cancer
Daprodustat (Jesduvroq)	GSK	HIF-PH inhibitor	Anaemia caused by CKD for adults on dialysis
Velmanase alfa (Lamzede)a	Chiesi	Recombinant α-mannosidase	Non-CNS manifestations of α-mannosidosis
Sparsentan (Filspari)	Travere	Endothelin and angiotensin II receptor antagonist	Proteinuria in primary IgA nephropathy
Omaveloxolone (Skyclarys)	Reata/Biogen	Mechanism unknown, NRF2 activator	Friedrich’s ataxia
Zavegepant (Zavzpret)	Pfizer	CGRP receptor antagonist	Migraine
Trofinetide (Daybue)	Acadia	Mechanism unknown	Rett syndrome
Retifanlimab (Zynyz)a	Incyte	PD1-targeted mAb	Merkel cell carcinoma
Rezafungin (Rezzayo)	Cidara	Echinocandin antifungal	Candidemia and invasive candidiasis
Leniolisib (Joenja)	Pharming	PI3Kδ inhibitor	Activated PI3Kδ syndrome
Tofersen (Qalsody)	Biogen	SOD1-targeted ASO	SOD1 amyotrophic lateral sclerosis
Pegunigalsidase alfa (Elfabrio)a	Chiesi	PEGylated recombinant α-galactosidase Α	Fabry disease
Fezolinetant (Veozah)	Astellas	Neurokinin 3 receptor antagonist	Hot flashes caused by menopause
Perfluorohexyloctane (Miebo)	Bausch + Lomb	Semifluorinated alkane	Dry eye disease
Epcoritamab (Epkinly)a	Genmab/AbbVie	CD20 × CD3 T-cell engager	DLBCL and high-grade B-cell lymphoma
Sulbactam, durlobactam (Xacduro)	Entasis	β-lactam antibacterial plus a β-lactamase inhibitor	Hospital-acquired and ventilator-associated bacterial pneumonia caused by susceptible ABC
Nirmatrelvir, ritonavir (Paxlovid)	Pfizer	SARS-CoV-2 main protease inhibitor plus a CYP3A inhibitor	Mild-to-moderate COVID-19
Flotufolastat F18 (Posluma)	Blue Earth	Radioactive diagnostic agent	PET imaging in prostate cancer
Sotagliflozin (Inpefa)	Lexicon	SGLT1/2 inhibitor	Heart failure
Glofitamab (Columvi)a	Genentech	CD20 × CD3 T-cell engager	DLBLC or large B-cell lymphoma
Ritlecitinib (Litfulo)	Pfizer	JAK3 inhibitor	Alopecia areata
Rozanolixizumab (Rystiggo)a	UCB	FcRn-targeted mAb	AChR- or MuSK-antibody-positive gMG
Somatrogon (Ngenla)a	Pfizer	Human growth hormone analogue	Growth hormone deficiency
Nirsevimab (Beyfortus)a	AstraZeneca	RSV F protein-targeted mAb	RSV lower respiratory tract disease
Quizartinib (Vanflyta)	Daiichi Sankyo	FLT3 kinase inhibitor	AML
Lotilaner (Xdemvy)	Tarsus	Ectoparasiticide	Demodex blepharitis
Zuranolone (Zurzuvae)	Sage	GABAA receptor PAM	Postpartum depression
Avacincaptad pegol (Izervay)	Iveric/Astellas	C5-targeted aptamer	Geographic atrophy secondary to AMD
Talquetamab (Talvey)a	Janssen	GPRC5D × CD3 T-cell engager	Multiple myeloma
Elranatamab (Elrexfio)a	Pfizer	BCMA × CD3 T-cell engager	Multiple myeloma
Palovarotene (Sohonos)	Ipsen	Retinoic acid receptor agonist	Fibrodysplasia ossificans progressiva
Pozelimab (Veopoz)a	Regeneron	C5-targeted mAb	CHAPLE disease
Motixafortide (Aphexda)	Biolinerx	CXCR4 inhibitor	Hematopoietic stem cell mobilization for autologous transplantation in multiple myeloma
Momelotinib (Ojjaara)	GSK	JAK1/2, ALK2 inhibitor	Myelofibrosis in adults with anaemia
Gepirone (Exxua)	Fabre-Kramer	5HT1A receptor agonist	Major depressive disorder
Cipaglucosidase alfa (Pombiliti)a	Amicus	Recombinant α-glucosidase	Pompe disease
Nedosiran (Rivfloza)	Novo Nordisk	LDHA-targeted siRNA	Primary hyperoxaluria type 1
Etrasimod (Velsipity)	Pfizer	S1P receptor modulator	Ulcerative colitis
Zilucoplan (Zilbrysq)	UCB	Complement C5 inhibitor	AChR-antibody positive gMG
Bimekizumab (Bimzelx)a	UCB	IL-17A/F-targeted mAb	Plaque psoriasis
Vamorolone (Agamree)	Santhera	Corticosteroid	Duchenne muscular dystrophy
Mirikizumab (Omvoh)a	Eli Lilly	IL-23-targeted mAb	Ulcerative colitis
Toripalimab (Loqtorzi)a	Coherus	PD1-targeted mAb	Nasopharyngeal carcinoma
Fruquintinib (Fruzaqla)	Takeda	VEGFR1/2/3 kinase inhibitor	Colorectal cancer
Taurolidine, heparin (Defencath)	Cormedix	Thiadiazinane antimicrobial plus an anticoagulant	Incidence of catheter-related bloodstream infections
Repotrectinib (Augtyro)	Bristol Myers Squibb	ROS1 and TRK kinase inhibitor	ROS1-positive NSCLC
Efbemalenograstim alfa (Ryzneuta)a	Evive	Recombinant leukocyte growth factor	Neutropenia
Capivasertib (Truqap)	AstraZeneca	AKT kinase inhibitor	Breast cancer
Nirogacestat (Ogsiveo)	Springworks	γ-secretase inhibitor	Desmoid tumours
Iptacopan (Fabhalta)	Novartis	Complement factor B inhibitor	Paroxysmal nocturnal haemoglobinuria
Birch triterpenes (Filsuvez)	Chiesi	Mechanism unknown	Epidermolysis bullosa
Eplontersen (Wainua)	Ionis/AstraZeneca	TTR-targeted ASO	hATTR with polyneuropathy

aBiologic approval. A, accelerated; ABC, Acinetobacter baumannii-calcoaceticus complex; AChR, anti-acetylcholine receptor; AMD, age-related macular degeneration; AML, acute myelogenous leukaemia; ASO, antisense oligonucleotide; B, breakthrough; CGRP, calcitonin gene-related peptide; CKD, chronic kidney disease; CNS, central nervous system; DLBCL, diffuse large B-cell lymphoma; ESR1, estrogen receptor 1; ER, estrogen receptor; FcRn, neonatal Fc receptor; gMG, generalized myasthenia gravis; hATTR, hereditary TTR amyloidosis; HER2, human epidermal growth factor receptor 2; HIF-PH, hypoxia-inducible factor prolyl hydroxylase; IgA, immunoglobulin A; mAb, monoclonal antibody; MuSK, muscle-specific tyrosine kinase; NSCLC, non-small-cell lung cancer; O, orphan; P, priority; PAM, positive allosteric modulator; PD1, programmed death receptor 1; RSV; respiratory syncytial virus; S, standard; S1P, sphingosine 1-phosphate; siRNA, small interfering RNA; TTR, transthyretin. Source: Drugs@FDA.

Table 2 | Selected CBER approvals in 2023

Biologic name (brand)	Sponsor	Properties	Indication
Fc-vwf-xten fusion protein (Altuviiio)	Bioverativ	Recombinant antihaemophilic factor	Haemophilia A
Omidubicel (Omisirge)	Gamida Cell	Nicotinamide modified allogeneic haematopoietic progenitor cell therapy	Neutrophil recovery in patients with haematologic malignancies
Fecal microbiota spores, live (Vowst)	Seres	Bacterial spore suspension in capsules for oral administration	C. difficile recurrence
RSV vaccine, adjuvanted (Arexvy)	GSK	Stabilized prefusion F subunit vaccine	RSV prevention, in over 60s
Beremagene geperpavec (Vyjuvek)	Krystal	HSV-based gene therapy with COL7A1 transgene	Skin wounds in COL7A1-mutated DEB
RSV vaccine (Abrysvo)	Pfizer	Bivalent stabilized prefusion F subunit vaccine	RSV prevention, in over 60s and pregnant women
Delandistrogene moxeparvovec (Elevidys)	Sarepta	AAV-based gene therapy with a micro-dystrophin transgene	DMD patients aged 4–5
Donislecel (Lantidra)	Celltrans	Allogeneic pancreatic islets	Type 1 diabetes patients unable to approach target HbA1c
Valoctocogene roxaparvovec (Roctavian)	Biomarin	AAV-based gene therapy with modified factor VIII transgene	Haemophilia A
Anthrax vaccine adsorbed, adjuvanted (Cyfendus)	Emergent	Protective antigen protein-based vaccine	Post-exposure prophylaxis
Prothrombin complex concentrate, human (Balfaxar)	Octapharma	Prothrombin complex concentrate containing factor II, VII, IX and X, and proteins C and S	Urgent warfarin reversal
Meningococcal groups A, B, C, W, and Y vaccine (Penbraya)	Pfizer	Conjugate and recombinant protein vaccine, pentivalent	Meningococcal disease prevention
Chikungunya vaccine, live (Ixchiq)	Valneva	Live, attenuated chikungunya virus vaccine	Chikungunya virus prevention
ADAMTS13, recombinant (Adzynma)	Takeda	Recombinant rADAMTS13	cTTP
Exagamglogene autotemcel (Casgevy)	Vertex/CRISPR	CRISPR–Cas9-based BCL11a-gene-editing therapy	Sickle cell disease
Lovotibeglogene autotemcel (Lyfgenia)	Bluebird	Lentivirus-based gene therapy with HbAT87Q transgene	Sickle cell disease

AAV, adeno-associated virus; C. difficile, Clostridioides difficile; cTTP, congenital thrombotic thrombocytopenic purpura; DEB, dystrophic epidermolysis bullosa; DMD, Duchenne muscular dystrophy; HbA1c; glycated haemoglobin; HSV, herpes simplex virus; RSV, respiratory syncytial virus. Source: FDA.

 PS. I els medicaments que no s'han aprovat:

Table 3 | Selected rejected drugs of 2023

Drug	Sponsor	Properties	Indication
Donanemab	Eli Lilly	Amyloid-β-targeted mAb	Alzheimer disease
Omecamtiv mecarbil	Cytokinetics	Myosin activator	Chronic heart failure
Inbakicept	ImmunityBio	IL-15 agonist fusion protein	Bladder cancer
Concizumab	Novo Nordisk	TFPI-targeted mAb	Haemophilia A and B
Obeticholic acid (Ocaliva)a	Alfasigma	Farnesoid X receptor agonist	NASH
Zuranolone (Zurzuvae)b	Sage	GABAA receptor PAM	MDD
Avasopasem manganese	Galera	Superoxide dismutase mimetic	Mucositis
Lebrikizumab	Eli Lilly	IL-13-targeted mAb	Atopic dermatitis
Gefapixant	Merck & Co.	P2X3 receptor antagonist	Chronic cough