Can We Be Happier? Evidence and Ethics
La pregunta de si podem ser més feliços, motiu del comentari del llibre d'avui, hauria de ser posterior a la de saber si som feliços ara. I com sempre anem a petar al problema de la mesura. L'economista Richard Layard porta molts anys explicant que podem mesurar la felicitat, i que hi ha dos components, la satisfacció amb la vida que té cadascun de nosaltres (felicitat experimentada) i la felicitat creada, fruit de la interacció social amb els altres. I diu:
We need to replace the harsh culture in which we judge our lives by our success compared with others. That is a zero-sum game – the total of relative success can never be changed, however hard each person tries to improve their own position. Instead, we need a goal for each of us which can lead to progress for all. That goal has to be the positive-sum activity of contributing to a happier society.
If we want a happier society, we have to aim at it explicitly. We will never achieve a happier society as a by-product. And it is a single overarching concept that we need if we are to displace the false idol of GDP. A dashboard of wellbeing indicators is certainly better than nothing, but it has been tried for half a century by the ‘social indicators’ movement with relatively little success.
Més endavant recupera els 10 factors que contribueixen a la felicitat:
There is no objective reason why so many lives in the West should be so stressful. We ourselves have created the stress by our goals, and the way our institutions respond to them. If we change our goals, we really can produce a happier society.Future generations will be shocked by many of the unthinking and unskilful features of life today. They will be shocked at the neglect of mental illness, at the stresses imposed on our children, and at the common assumption that everyone is an egotist.So the world happiness movement can indeed bring in a better, gentler culture and do it fast. But what happens will ultimately depend on each one of us. We can all be heroes in the happiness revolution
PS. El concepte de societat d'obligacions recíproques és de Collier.
The crisis of democratic capitalism
En aquest blog he escrit anteriorment sobre reimaginar el capitalisme i realment fa molts anys que se'n parla però qui dia passa any empeny. Ara en Martin Wolf, cap d'opinió de FT acaba de publicar un llibre il·lustrador. Ho és perquè explica amb tot detall com hem arribat fins aquí, i què caldria fer per avançar en les institucions democràtiques i econòmiques, i evitar així més d'un ensurt.
Aquest llibre argumenta que quan la gent no veu cap esperança i perd la confiança en les institucions democràtiques, tant la democràcia com els mercats poden fallar i fallaran. En resum, cal una reforma radical i valenta de l'economia capitalista i hem d'enfortir els vincles econòmics de la ciutadania alhora que s'aprofundeix la cooperació internacional.
El llibre es llegeix magníficament, està molt ben escrit. Destaco alguns paràgrafs clau:
A market economy that operates under trustworthy rules, rather than the whims of the powerful, underpins prosperity and lowers the stakes of politics. In turn, a competitive democracy induces politicians to offer policies that will improve the performance of the economy and so the welfare of the people. Beyond these practical reasons for the marriage of liberal democracy and market economy, there is also a moral one: both are founded on a belief in the value of human agency—people have a right to do the best they can for themselves; people have a similar right to exercise a voice in public decisions. At bottom, both are complementary aspects of human freedom and dignity.
Els objectius de reforma del capitalisme democràtic haurien de ser:
Removing harms, not universal happiness, is the objective. The approach to reform is that of “piecemeal social engineering,” as recommended by Karl Popper, not the revolutionary overreach that has so often brought calamity.
Behind these specific proposals is a wider perspective. A universal suffrage democracy will insist on a citizenship that is both economic and political. This means that business cannot be free to do whatever it wishes. It means that taxes must be paid, including by the economically powerful. It means that the state must be competent and active, yet also law-governed and accountable. All of this was the clear lesson of the twentieth century.
I sobre el concepte de ciutadania, el que no és i el que és:
Here are things this does not mean.
It does not mean that democratic states should have no concern for the welfare of noncitizens. Nor does it mean that it sees the success of its own citizens as a mirror image of the failures of others. On the contrary, it must seek mutually beneficial relations with other states.
It does not mean that states should cut themselves off from free and fruitful exchange with outsiders. Trade, movement of ideas, movement of people, and movement of capital, properly regulated, can be highly beneficial.
It does not mean that states should avoid cooperating closely with one another to achieve shared goals. This applies above all to actions designed to protect the global environment.
Yet there are things it clearly does mean.
It means that the first concern of democratic states is the welfare of their citizens. If this is to be real, certain things must follow.
Every citizen should have the reasonable possibility of acquiring an education that would allow them to participate as fully as possible in the life of a high-skilled modern economy.
Every citizen should also have the security needed to thrive, even if burdened by the ill luck of illness, disability, and other misfortunes.
Every citizen should have the protections needed to be free from abuse, physical and mental.
Every citizen should be able to cooperate with other workers in order to protect their collective rights.
Every citizen, and especially successful ones, should expect to pay taxes sufficient to sustain such a society.
Those who manage corporations should understand that they have obligations to the societies that make their existence possible.
Citizens are entitled to decide who is allowed to come and work in their countries and who is entitled to share the obligations and rights of citizenship with them.
Politics must be susceptible to the influence of all citizens, not just the wealthiest.
Policy should seek to create and sustain a vigorous middle class, while ensuring a safety net for everybody.
All citizens, whatever their race, ethnicity, religion, or gender are entitled to equality of treatment by the state and the law.
The West cannot go back to the 1960s. It cannot go back to a world of mass industrialization, where most educated women did not work, where there were clear ethnic and racial hierarchies, and where the Western countries still dominated the globe.
Missatge contundent pels qui el vulguin sentir, no podem tornar als 60s, i de vegades penso que hi anem de camí.
I per aquells que no els agrada el capitalisme i el voldrien fer desaparèixer, unes paraules de recordança:
There are, it is true, alternative ways to seek power under democratic capitalism. All will fail. One extreme is to offer a fully socialized economy. But the economy will founder, and the rulers will be forced out of power or seize it undemocratically, as happened most recently in Venezuela. An opposite extreme is to marry laissez-faire economics to a populism founded on anti-intellectualism, racism, and cultural conservatism. Such pluto-populism is also likely to end in an autocracy in which even plutocrats are insecure. A still faster route to autocracy is via a blending of the two extremes in nationalist socialism (or national socialism). This combines a welfare state with arbitrary rule by demagogues. This, too, will ultimately ruin both the economy and democracy, as the unaccountable gangster in charge rewards cronies and punishes opponents.
Human beings must act collectively as well as individually. Acting together, within a democracy, means acting and thinking as citizens.
If we do not do so, democracy will fail, and our freedoms will evaporate.
It is our generation’s duty to ensure it does not. It took too long to see the danger. Now it is a moment of great fear and faint hope. We must recognize the danger and fight now if we are to turn the hope into reality. If we fail, the light of political and personal freedom might once again disappear from the world.
L'alerta és clara per qui la vulgui sentir, és el deure de la nostra generació, ens hi juguem la llibertat. Ho diu ben clar. Actuar depèn de cadascú de nosaltres i de tots nosaltres col·lectivament.
Per tant, si que és possible reimaginar el capitalisme i en Martin Wolf dona algunes pistes. Molt recomanable la lectura i relectura pausada. Malauradament em temo que a molts dirigents els passarà per alt i ni se'n adonaran que s'ha publicat.
Why not focus directly on increasing measured human happiness? Why not try to improve people’s overall quality of life, as it is subjectively seen by citizens themselves?
Contents:
Introduction: Making Wellbeing Policies Effective
Timothy Besley & Irene Bucelli
Wellbeing as the Goal of Policy
Richard Layard
Accounting for Consequences and Claims in Policy
Paul Dolan
Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Public Policy: On the Dangers of Single Metric Accounting
Johanna Thoma
Wellbeing in Public Policy: Contributions Based on Sen’s Capability Approach
Paul Anand
Incorporating Wellbeing and Mental Health Research to Improve Pandemic Response
Michael Daly & Liam Delaney
COVID-19 and Mental Health and Wellbeing Research: Informing Targeted, Integrated, and Long-Term Responses to Health Emergencies
Annette Bauer
Health, Wellbeing, and Democratic Citizenship: A Review and Research Agenda
Christopher J. Anderson et al.
Health and Disability Gaps in Political Engagement: A Short Review
Mikko Mattila
What We Owe Each Other.A New Social Contract for a Better Society
A thought -provoking book. Chapter 5 is devoted to Health:
Being healthy is the most important determinant of our wellbeing. Physical and mental health (subjective well-being as it is called in the academic research) rank at the top of every major study of happiness across the world. Ultimately, this is why every society aspires to provide health care for its population. And because the costs of providing health care are reduced when a large population pools its resources, and because a healthy labour force is also good for the economy, the social contract in every society includes health care in some form or another.
The great issues:
We owe each other more. A more generous and inclusive social contract would recognise our interdependencies, provide minimum protections to all, share some risks collectively and ask everyone to contribute as much as they can for as long as they can. This is not about increasing the welfare state, but about investing in people and building a new system of risk sharing to increase overall well-being. Change will come inevitably because the forces of technology, demography and environmental pressures will drive it. The question is whether we prepare for that change or continue to allow our societies to be buffeted by these powerful forces, as we have in recent decades. This book lays out the challenges we face and provides a menu of alternatives for a better social contract around families, education, health, work, old age and between the generations. It is not a blueprint, but it provides a direction of travel that is economically feasible. Nor is it a fixed menu – countries may choose to implement some elements and not others depending on their values and preferences.
Bettering Humanomics. A New, and Old, Approach to Economic Science
The discoveries I have made by responding critically, yet as amiably as I could manage, are two:
1. There seems to be emerging a new and I think more serious and sensible way of doing economic science—quantitatively serious, philosophically serious, historically serious, and ethically serious, too, as I argue in this volume. The economist Bart Wilson and a few others nowadays call it the “humanomics,” as in the title here.4
2. But, I argue in the other volume, neoinstitutionalism, from Douglass North and Daron Acemoglu and many other economists and political scientists, is not the way forward. Scientifically speaking, its factual claims, like those of the other recent neobehaviorist fashions, such as neuroeconomics and behavioral finance and happiness studies, are dubious—or, at best, questionably founded and argued. The neoinstitutionalists, like the others, do not listen, really listen, to the evidence of humans, or to their friends’ scientific questions and objections. Substantively, they treat creative adults like a flock of little children, terrible twos, to whom we need not listen. We need, they say, merely to “observe their behavior,” omitting for some reason linguistic behavior. And then we record the behavior in questionable metrics. The children-citizens will be pushed around with “incentives,” beloved of Samuelsonian economists and econowannabes. From a great height of fatherly expertise in discerning and designing Max U institutions, the neoinstitutionalist looks down with contempt on the merely human actions and interactions of free adults.
A key book by controversial Deirdre McCloskey, this is the outline:
Part I. The Proposal
Chapter 1. Humanomics and Liberty Promise Better Economic Science
Chapter 2. Adam Smith Practiced Humanomics, and So Should We
Chapter 3. Economic History Illustrates the Problems with Nonhumanomics
Chapter 4. An Economic Science Needs the Humanities
Chapter 5. It’s Merely a Matter of Common Sense and Intellectual Free Trade
Chapter 6. After All, Sweet Talk Rules a Free Economy
Chapter 7. Therefore We Should Walk on Both Feet, Like Ludwig Lachmann
Chapter 8. That Is, Economics Needs Theories of Human Minds beyond Behaviorism
Part II. The Killer App
Chapter 9. The Killer App of Humanomics Is the Evidence That the Great Enrichment Came from Ethics and Rhetoric
Chapter 10. The Dignity of Liberalism Did It
Chapter 11. Ideas, Not Incentives, Underlie It
Chapter 12. Even as to Time and Location
Chapter 13. The Word’s the Thing
Part III. The Doubts
Chapter 14. Doubts by Analytic Philosophers about the Killer App Are Not Persuasive
Chapter 15. Nor by Sociologists or Political Philosophers
Chapter 16. Nor Even by Economic Historians
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) embeds an assumption at odds with most economic analysis–that of constant returns to health in the creation of happiness (utility). We aim to reconcile it with the bulk of economic theory.
Therefore,
As health payers increasingly turn to CEA for value assessment, it becomes even more important to assure that it reflect the preferences of real people. Current models run an important risk by not considering the consequences of diminishing returns and risk aversion over health. Continuing to assume that the incremental value of health is invariant to severity of illness endangers the foundations of CEA. The combination of the diminishing returns and severity of illness adjustments suggests that we are probably overvaluing treatments of low-severity illnesses (possibly by a factor of 2 or more) and undervaluing treatments of very high-severity conditions (possibly by a factor of 5 or more).
This is solved by the GRACE framework that shows how to generalize traditional CEA models to incorporate the effects of diminishing returns to health improvements as severity of illness increases. This creates cost-effectiveness thresholds (stated as multipliers of consumption) that incorporate risk preferences both in consumption and in QoL and that increase with severity of illness.
An Economist’s Lessons on Happiness
The Easterlin paradox is a finding in happiness economics formulated in 1974 by Richard Easterlin, then professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania, and the first economist to study happiness data. The paradox states that at a point in time happiness varies directly with income both among and within nations, but over time happiness does not trend upward as income continues to grow. It is the contradiction between the point-of-time and time series findings that is the root of the paradox.
Does money make you happy? This is one of the questions addressed in the book.
Richard Easterlin says :
In considering the effect on happiness of increasing income, we saw that because of interpersonal comparison, the reference level for income (the incomes of others) tends to increase along with one’s actual income, and happiness remains unchanged. By contrast, when intrapersonal comparison chiefly determines the reference level, as it does for health, the happiness outcome is different. The reference level for health is rooted in past experience and usually changes much less than the reference level for income
And on the Happiness Revolution,
Here it is: The Happiness Revolution. Whereas the two prior revolutions, the Industrial Revolution and the Demographic Revolution, led to a transformation in people’s objective circumstances, as indexed by the multiplication of real GDP per capita and life expectancy, the principal concern of the Happiness Revolution is different and calls for a different kind of measure. Which is? “What people have to say about themselves,” Andy offers. “Specifically, people’s feelings about their lives as a whole.” Yes! This revolution centers on people’s feelings—how happy they are and how satisfied with their lives. It becomes a revolution, the Happiness Revolution, when the findings show a marked improvement in people’s feelings of well-being, i.e., their subjective well-being. And this is what’s happening now!
A controversial view. You may agree or not, anyway, a recommended reading.
Harari’s larger contention is that our homocentric creed, devoted to human liberty and happiness, will be destroyed by the approaching post-humanist horizon. Free will and individualism are, he says, illusions. We must reconceive ourselves as mere meat machines running algorithms, soon to be overtaken by metal machines running better ones. By then, we will no longer be able to sustain our comforting creed of “autonomy,” the belief, which he finds in Rousseau, that “I will find deep within myself a clear and single inner voice, which is my authentic self,” and that “my authentic self is completely free.” In reality, Harari maintains, we have merely a self-deluding, “narrating self,” one that recites obviously tendentious stories, shaped by our evolutionary history to help us cope with life. We are—this is his most emphatic point—already machines of a kind, robots unaware of our own programming. Humanism will be replaced by Dataism; and if the humanist revolution made us masters the Dataist revolution will make us pets.Does this makes any sense? Is it possible to remain as the current best seller with such a message?
• Evaluative wellbeing: evaluations of how satisfied people are with their livesIs it possible that positive subjective wellbeing is a protective factor for health?
• Hedonic wellbeing: feelings or moods such as happiness,sadness and anger
• Eudemonic wellbeing: judgments about the meaning and purpose of life
Research into subjective wellbeing and health at older ages is at an early stage. Nevertheless, the wellbeing of elderly people is important, and evidence suggests that positive hedonic states, life evaluation, and eudemonic wellbeing are relevant to health and quality of life as people age. Health-care systems should be concerned not only with illness and disability, but also with supporting methods to improve positive psychological states.Do you have any clue of how to do it?
Culyer’s concept of “extra-welfarism” helps to liberate health economists from the confines of the traditional “Paretian” or “welfarist” approach to evaluating alternative policies and institutions that dominated economic thinking in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Traditional “welfarist” economic analysis assumes that subjective individual preferences or “utilities” (understood either as the desires that motivate individual decisions or the feelings of happiness that may or may not follow those decisions) are the be all and end all of the social good when it comes to doing “economic” analysis properly. Culyer’s “extrawelfarist” approach allows economists to use additional sources of information about individual wellbeing or lourishing – i.e. additional to subjective desires and feelings – for evaluating alternative policies and institutions. In keeping with his professional humility, of course, he does not endorse any specific view of what constitutes a flourishing life: “Flourishing may mean different things to different people; all I require is that it be a high goal whose accomplishment gives a deep satisfaction to the one living it, and perhaps others too, as when it is said of someone who has died ‘that was a life well-lived’.
The concept of “extra-welfarism” builds upon the work of Amartya Sen, who first coined the term “welfarism” and wrote of the need to use “non-welfare” or “non-utility” information when assessing individual wellbeing. Culyer developed and refined this idea in the specific context of health care, showing in particular how non-welfare information about people’s health – and not merely people’s health-related preferences or desires – could be fruitfully used in the health care field. The three essays in turn set out the basic idea; develop and refine the distinction between “welfarist” and “extra-welfarist” approaches to health economics, in a multiauthor essay originally lead authored by the eminent Dutch health economist, Werner Brouwer; and then explore a range of different practical applications of both “welfarist” and “extra-welfarist” approaches in the health sector, showing how both can be fruitful in different contexts.
