Una nova mesura de la morbiditat poblacional

 Development and Assessment of a New Framework for Disease Surveillance, Prediction, and Risk Adjustment: The Diagnostic Items Classification System

En Randy Ellis ja abans de la pandèmia estava apuntant cap un nou sistema que permetés la mesura de la morbiditat amb dades diagnòstiques sense una classificació categòrica dels pacients. És a dir es tracta d'una evolució dels models que ell ha proposat des de fa anys junt amb Arlene Ash, els DCGs, i alhora una evolució del Clinical Classification Software.

L'objectiu:

Our objective was to create a clinically detailed, transparent, well-documented, nonproprietary classification system suitable for predicting diverse outcomes using ICD-10-CM diagnostic information and share a core set of predictive models that can be used on other data sets and populations.

Els tres tipus:

We created 3 types of DXIs. The primary or main effect DXIs, called DXI_1, focus on clinical dimensions in each diagnosis. Diagnoses were assigned up to 4 DXI_1s. In some cases, we created both broader and narrower DXI_1s that overlapped because we did not know a priori the level of detail preferred for prediction. We illustrate this approach below in our discussion of sepsis and hypertension in pregnancy DXI_1s.

The second group, DXI_2 modifiers, cut across DXI_1s. Some identify disease severity, such as “with complications,” “hemorrhage,” “secondary,” “bilateral,” and “with coma.” Others may be useful for disease monitoring, including flags for future research and epidemiological surveillance, such as sexually transmitted and vaccine-preventable infectious diseases. Certain diagnoses for external causes and factors influencing health status (whose codes begin with V-Z) were not assigned a DXI_1 and were instead only assigned DXI_2 modifiers.

Finally, DXI_3 scaled variables capture test results, disease severity, or clinically relevant distinctions not easily captured in binary DXI_1 categories. These include body mass index (BMI; calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared), neonatal birth weight, neonatal gestational age, pregnancy trimester, low vision/blindness stages, coma scale measures, stroke scores, and duration of unconsciousness. As an example, the DXI_3 variable for BMI, calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared, takes on values between 18.5 and 70, corresponding to ordered groups of BMI ranges. When comparing the DXI classification system to existing models, we included only main effects (DXI_1s) as predictors. This comparison cleanly demonstrates the value of the DXIs richer classification of diagnoses. Quantifying the additional value of using DXI_2 and DXI_3 items is left for future research.

 Exemples:

La capacitat predictiva en despesa, aquí:

Si això és així, caldrà provar-ho ben aviat, amb 2929 variables explicatives assoleix una variació explicada del 51%.

El software per provar-lo en SAS aquí.

Quina va ser la inversió pública a la recerca de la vacuna mRNA per a covid?

US public investment in development of mRNA covid-19 vaccines: retrospective cohort study

 Allò que observem i es veu reflectit als diaris no és pas necessàriament el que passa. Ho sabem. La dificultat es troba en esbrinar com la immediatesa de la informació perd peces importants a considerar per comprendre la realitat. L'exemple de la inversió pública en vacunes és molt clar. Hi va haver unes empreses que van fer accessible la vacuna a la població, però qui va invertir realment per arribar a aquest final?.

Al BMJ trobareu una resposta parcial, la part d'inversió pública nordamericana en R+D, que abans de la pandèmia va ser de 336,8 milions de $ i durant la pandèmia va ser de 2.365,7 milions de $, un total de 2.704,5 milions de $. Es tracta d'una xifra notable que ja s'havia recollit aproximadament en una publicació anterior de Richard Frank a Health Affairs. La taula adjunta explica els detalls de qui hi va contribuir i amb quin import:

I recordeu el que deia ahir de Barney Graham i el seu paper decisiu?. Doncs si, més enllà dels diners hi ha persones. En Barney surt a la taula anterior a l'epígraf NIAID, import 71,4 milions de $. De vegades no és tant important els recursos com la capacitat de compartir coneixement lliure que és el que va fer.

Aquest gràfic és molt il·lustratiu de les tecnologies per assolir la vacuna i la seqüència temporal:

I la conclusió de l'article amplifica la meva entrada d'ahir:

The development of mRNA covid-19 vaccines during the pandemic was a monumental scientific success. This achievement was possible, in large part, because of significant US public investment in research and development during the preceding 35 years and record setting public contributions during the pandemic to accelerate and reduce the financial risk of vaccine development. The resulting mRNA vaccines have benefitted millions of people and saved millions of lives. The substantial role played by public funding should help to justify greater efforts by the US, Canadian, and German governments to assure equitable and affordable access to this lifesaving technology in the US and globally.

Europa (Alemania i UE) van aportar 500 milions a BionTech per la vacuna, la diferència és notable amb els USA. Però també és cert que BionTech es va aprofitar de l'aportació nordamericana al coneixement. Saber la contribució precisa de cadascú és complex. Ara bé, com ja vaig dir, algú s'ha de revisar molt seriosament el tema de patents perquè l'aportació pública a la recerca és massa important per ser apropiada privadament. Són precisament els ciutadans nord-americans els que haurien d'impulsar-ho més, però no és així. Algú ha assenyalat que precisament aquesta protecció de patents és la que permet dominar la tecnologia des dels USA. És a dir, inverteixen més que ningú, protegeixen més que ningú, s'apropien del resultat més que ningú només aquells que converteixen el resultat de la recerca en actiu financer. Aquest és el cicle del domini tecnològic i econòmic. Europa mentrestant dorm.

PD. Aquest gràfic ho resumeix molt bé. Quin és el ranking de capitalització de les empreses tecnológiques del món? N'hi ha alguna d'europea? Només una i al final...Explicat el dimecres per en Martin Wolf.

Una de les fites més grans de la ciència: mRNA i les vacunes

 La vacuna. La carrera para desarrollar una vacuna contra la COVID-19

Elegimos ir a la Luna. Crónica desde dentro de cómo se hizo posible lo imposible

The Messenger: Moderna, the Vaccine, and the Business Gamble That Changed the World

Just he acabat de llegir aquests tres llibres que fan referència a la vacuna BionTech-Pfizer i ModeRNA pel SARS-CoV-2. Primer va BionTech, per un motiu elemental són els que tenien el coneixement i el que va passar es que no van fer com a ModeRNA que alhora es van dedicar a la fabricació. Pfizer va ser capaç de posar-la al mercat en temps record. I va primer de tot BionTech perquè és la persistència en la recerca la que els ha portat a aquest resultat extraordinari en temps i efectivitat. Començant per comprendre els fonaments i després per encapsular l'mRNA que codifica la proteïna S en nanopartícules lipídiques i així crear anticossos neutralitzants al virus SARS-CoV-2.

Aquesta és una de les grans fites que ha assolit la ciència en un temps molt curt. És cert, però portaven més d'una dècada treballant-hi sense cap producte al mercat. I mentrestant uns inversors alemanys seguien apostant per ells.

El cas de ModeRNA és molt similar. Tenen un enfocament clavat en el potencial del mRNA i el desenvolupen en càncer, però no assoleixen cap producte al mercat després d'una dècada. A diferència de BionTech, el govern nordamericà va donar-los moltes subvencions.

Al darrera de BionTech i ModeRNA hi ha un personatge que surt a tots els llibres i és clau per l'èxit, Barney Graham. Des de l'Institut de Malalties Infeccioses nord-americà és capaç d'oferir-los guiatge i suport. Crec que ell sol es mereixeria un llibre.

Ara passada la pandèmia comença la lluita de les patents. ModeRNA reclama a BionTech perquè diuen que ha utilitzat coneixement que havien patentat abans. I ja hi som. El que hi ha en joc és molt, perquè el nombre de patents és elevat i el mRNA seria una via molt exitosa d'afrontar nous tractaments per càncer i moltes més malalties. Crec que haurien d'aprendre del que va passar amb els anticossos monoclonals, ho vaig explicar fa temps.

Tres llibres fonamentals i recomanables per comprendre què significa mRNA i com hem arribat on som, sans i estalvis (encara que no tots, gairebé 7 milions de morts per COVID), i alhora és moment d'un reconeixement als inversors que van apostar per la recerca a llarg termini i que va justament en contra dels resultats a curt que espera Wall Street.

Després de llegir aquests llibres pensava com tant poca gent ha aconseguit fer tant per la humanitat. Gent amb un talent immens, fruit d'un esforç i persistència continuada.

PD. El que he escrit sobre vacunes.

Pandemethics (2)

 Pandemic Bioethics

Contents:
Chapter 1 Historical Epidemics
The Spanish Flu of 1918
Cholera
Plague
Smallpox
Yellow Fever
Malaria
Chapter 2 Modern Viral Pandemics
Polio
Asian Flu of 1957 and Hong Kong Flu of 1968
Ebola
Swine Flu of 1976
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
SARS1
Swine Flu of 2009
Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS)
Zika
Other Viral Diseases Affecting Humans
Chapter 3 The Medical Nature of SARS2
Disputed Origins of SARS2
The Clinical Course of COVID-19
Transmission and Immunity
Chapter 4 Policies for Containment
Quarantine as a Preventive Allocation Strategy
Four Models of Fighting Pandemics
Successes and Failures around the World
Intermittent Lockdowns, Denial, and the American Confusion
Chapter 5 Who Should Live When Not All Can?
Ethical Theories as Guides
Historical Background: The God Committee and Social Worth
A Relevant Digression: “Sickest First” Allocation and UNOS
Enter Bioethicists
Saints and Sacrifice
Covid, Cognitively Challenged Patients, and Rights of Disabled Persons
Unexpected Allocation Issues
Chapter 6 Developing Vaccines
A Brief History of Vaccines
Kinds of Vaccines
Ethical Issues in Developing Vaccines
Speeding Up Development of Experimental Vaccines
Other Problems with Vaccine Trials
Politics and Vaccines for Covid
Chapter 7 Allocating Vaccines
Success with Quick Production of Vaccines
The CDC and the States
Ability to Pay and Access to Vaccines
Allocation Priorities
Vaccination Complexities
Mandatory Vaccinations
Global Vaccine Distribution
Possible Bad Scenarios
Chapter 8 Acts and Omissions, the Trolley Problem, and Prisoner’s Dilemmas
Acts vesus Omissions
The Trolley Problem
Prisoner’s Dilemmas and Vaccination Uptake
Chapter 9 Liberty and Privacy
Philosophical Positions on Liberty
Problems of Contact Tracing
Controlling Pandemics versus Protecting Privacy
Privacy of Genetic Information Collected during Testing in Pandemics
Chapter 10 Status Certificates
Defining Key Terms
What Is the Purpose of Status Certificates?
Benefits of Status Certificates
Problems with Status Certificates
Chapter 11 Structural Inequalities and Vulnerable Groups
Who Is Most Vulnerable in a Pandemic?
Differences in Efforts to Control Infection in Different Vulnerable Groups
Chapter 12 Leadership during Pandemics
Leadership and the Virtue of Trust
The WHO’s Leaders Made Mistakes
Donald Trump and American Leadership
Judgment of US Leaders during the Pandemic
Chapter 13 The Future
The Future of COVID-19
Lessons to Learn
More Pandemics Will Come
What Will Happen Next?

Vaccine makers (3)

 Longshot. The Inside Story of the Race for a COVID-19 Vaccine

Economics of pandemics (4)

 The Economics of Pandemics. Exploring Globally Shared Experiences

Topics:

The COVID-19 Pandemic as a Globally Shared Experience: An Introduction

Pandemic Economics: Essential Features and Outstanding Questions

Pandemic Analysis I: Global Governance for a Global Pandemic?

Pandemic Analysis II: Governmental Actions During the Pandemic—Lockdown or No Lockdown?

Pandemic Analysis III: The Great Reset, People’s Uprisings, and Other Radical Change Proposals

Pandemic Analysis IV: Is the COVID-19 Pandemic a Doomsday Scenario for Climate Change?

Pandemic Analysis V: The Science and Economics of a Vaccine for Ending the Pandemic

The Economics of Pandemics as a Globally Shared Experience: A Theory

Some Yet Unresolved Questions and Mysteries About the COVID-19 Pandemic

Vaccines makers (2)

 The Vaccine. Inside the Race to Conquer the COVID-19 Pandemic

The Vaccine draws back the curtain on one of the most important medical breakthroughs of our age; it will reveal how Doctors Sahin and Türeci were able to develop twenty vaccine candidates within weeks, convince Big Pharma to support their ambitious project, navigate political interference from the Trump administration and the European Union, and provide more than three billion doses of the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine to countries around the world in record time.

The five essential healthcare suppliers

 Taking access to the next level: mobilising five essential healthcare sectors

There are five groups that are crucial: Big Pharma, generic medicine manufacturers, vaccine manufacturers, diagnostics companies and medical gas companies. 

In all cases, there are a few dominant players that have a big impact on healthcare

Vaccine makers

 Vaxxers: The Inside Story of the Oxford AstraZeneca Vaccine and the Race Against the Virus

The inside story of the Oxford AstraZeneca vaccine, from two of the leading scientists who created it.

Beyond the vaccines:

It seems to me that there are three broad areas that limited our response to Covid-19, and that we need to improve in order to be in a better place the next time: infrastructure (including research and manufacturing), systems (including surveillance, stockpiling and travel bans) and global cooperation and collaboration. The solutions are not necessarily cheap or easy: but nor is dealing with a pandemic. We invest heavily in armed forces and intelligence and diplomacy to defend against wars. In the same way, we need to invest in pandemic preparedness to defend against pandemics.

 

The pandemic in US

 Uncontrolled Spread. Why COVID-19 Crushed Us and How We Can Defeat the Next Pandemic

New book by Scott Gottlieb , former FDA comissioner

COVID revealed dangerous gaps in the US public health preparedness, medical infrastructure, and healthcare system. We lacked the public health capacity and resiliency we thought we had. In the most advanced healthcare system in the world, we ran out of medical masks. We had to retrofit anesthesia machines and turn them into respirators. We didn’t have enough swabs to collect samples from patients’ noses.

Our system was set up well to handle singular, technology-intensive, and complex problems like developing a novel vaccine or antibody drugs. We do this better than anyone. But it faltered when we were faced with more mundane problems like manufacturing those vaccines in bulk, deploying testing centers, or making nose swabs to collect respiratory samples. When we finally developed safe and effective therapeutics and vaccines that could treat or prevent infection, we couldn’t manufacture enough of them in time to supply the nation for the winter surge. We had to set up elaborate rationing schemes. Then, we were unable to establish an efficient distribution plan. Antibody drugs went unused because we couldn’t deliver them. 

The virus made clear that we’ll need to fundamentally alter the way we approach all of these risks. If we don’t, our society will remain excessively vulnerable. For starters, we’ll have to lean much more on our intelligence agencies, and in a different fashion. International agreements alone haven’t provided us with the information we need about emerging threats. There’s little reason to believe they’ll perform much better in the future. The devastation caused by the pandemic proved that these risks, and our preparedness for them, is a matter of national security on par with other threats. We’re going to have to build the capacity to seek out the information we need to protect ourselves. Sometimes that will demand that we avail ourselves of the tools and tradecraft of our clandestine services. The challenge will be to maintain collaboration and multilateral efforts even as we turn more heavily toward intelligence services to guard against the risk of new contagions. 

 

Patents are Not the Problem (right now)!

 I agree absolutely with Alex Tabarrock and his post in Marginal revolution. He says:

Patents are not the problem. All of the vaccine manufacturers are trying to increase supply as quickly as possible. Billions of doses are being produced–more than ever before in the history of the world. Licenses are widely available. AstraZeneca have licensed their vaccine for production with manufactures around the world, including in India, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, China and South Africa. J&J’s vaccine has been licensed for production by multiple firms in the United States as well as with firms in Spain, South Africa and France. Sputnik has been licensed for production by firms in India, China, South Korea, Brazil and pending EMA approval with firms in Germany and France. Sinopharm has been licensed in the UAE, Egypt and Bangladesh. Novavax has licensed its vaccine for production in South Korea, India, and Japan and it is desperate to find other licensees but technology transfer isn’t easy and there are limited supplies of raw materials:

Virtually overnight, [Novavax] set up a network of outside manufacturers more ambitious than one outside executive said he’s ever seen, but they struggled at times to transfer their technology there amid pandemic travel restrictions. They were kicked out of one factory by the same government that’s bankrolled their effort. Competing with larger competitors, they’ve found themselves short on raw materials as diverse as Chilean tree bark and bioreactor bags. They signed a deal with India’s Serum Institute to produce many of their COVAX doses but now face the realistic chance that even when Serum gets to full capacity — and they are behind — India’s government, dealing with the world’s worst active outbreak, won’t let the shots leave the country.

Plastic bags are a bigger bottleneck than patents. The US embargo on vaccine supplies to India was precisely that the Biden administration used the DPA to prioritize things like bioreactor bags and filters to US suppliers and that meant that India’s Serum Institute was having trouble getting its production lines ready for Novavax. CureVac, another potential mRNA vaccine, is also finding it difficult to find supplies due to US restrictions (which means supplies are short everywhere). As Derek Lowe said:

Abolishing patents will not provide more shaker bags or more Chilean tree bark, nor provide more of the key filtration materials needed for production. These processes have a lot of potential choke points and rate-limiting steps in them, and there is no wand that will wave that complexity away.

Technology transfer has been difficult for AstraZeneca–which is one reason they have had production difficulties–and their vaccine uses relatively well understood technology. The mRNA technology is new and has never before been used to produce at scale. Pfizer and Moderna had to build factories and distribution systems from scratch. There are no mRNA factories idling on the sidelines. If there were, Moderna or Pfizer would be happy to license since they are producing in their own factories 24 hours a day, seven days a week (monopolies restrict supply, remember?). Why do you think China hasn’t yet produced an mRNA vaccine? Hint: it isn’t fear about violating IP. Moreover, even Moderna and Pfizer don’t yet fully understand their production technology, they are learning by doing every single day. Moderna has said that they won’t enforce their patents during the pandemic but no one has stepped up to produce because no one else can.

 More information in his post.

Some weeks ago a journalist asked to me the same question, and I said more or less, the same!. There is no need to start discussions about patents in WCO, only the enforcement and implementation of mandatory licenses can be helpful.

¿Qué opina sobre las patentes de las vacunas de la covid-19? ¿Considera que, en este caso, deberían contemplarse excepciones al derecho de explotación exclusiva?

Antes de hablar de patentes, conviene considerar la inversión pública en investigación. Por ejemplo, en la medida que hay una vacuna cuyo coste de investigación ha sido sufragado en un 97% por el sector público, resulta lógico que se compre a un precio equivalente al coste de fabricación, tal como sucede.  Ahora bien, también sería deseable que se obligara a licenciar el proceso a otros fabricantes. En el caso de vacunas de RNA mensajero, el nivel de inversión pública en Estados Unidos es notable y sin embargo no ha sucedido lo mismo. Por consiguiente, los gobiernos deben gestionar las contrapartidas de la inversión pública en investigación.

•  ¿Considera que sería positiva una liberación de las patentes de las vacunas contra la covid? ¿Por qué? 

En mi opinión ya existen mecanismos que permiten conseguir que las vacunas sean asequibles y son las licencias obligatorias. Tal regulación que se configuró en la reunión de la OMC en Doha en el año 2003. Desafortunadamente no se ha desarrollado suficientemente por los países. Las condiciones por las que se deberían aplicar tales licencias quedan explícitas en la Declaración. Tales condiciones hacen referencia a la definición de emergencia y crisis de salud pública. En esta pandemia se daban las condiciones para su aplicación. Visto así, el debate necesita centrarse entre patentes y licencias obligatorias atendiendo a condiciones concretas. 

•  ¿Existen mecanismos ya reglados para que, en situaciones como ésta, más allá de la patente, se garantice la llegada de las vacunas a todos los países (incluyendo los de nivel económico más bajo)?

En realidad la Alianza Mundial para vacunas e inmunización (GAVI) nació para ello. En el caso de la COVID, la OMS a través de GAVI y otras instituciones ha impulsado la iniciativa COVAX que pretende ofrecer vacunas a países en desarrollo. Aún así sabemos que el esfuerzo es insuficiente a la vista de los resultados, el 87% de las vacunas ha ido a países ricos, y en los menos desarrollados tan solo ha llegado el 0,2%.

 

What you should know about the Covid-19 vaccines?

 The Covid-19 Vaccine Guide. The Quest for Implementation of Safe and Effective Vaccinations

A book that explains all the details of one of the greatest achievements in medical research,

In the United States, in just over 11 months, two mRNA vaccines were developed and manufactured in parallel, tested in phase 1, 2, and the phase 3 large clinical trials, found to be safe and efficacious, and distributed initially in December 2020 to healthcare workers and residents of long-term care facilities, followed by those over 65 and with underlying medical conditions in January 2021. The story of that remarkable scientific and manufacturing accomplishment is described later in this chapter.

Why do these vaccines work? What is an immune correlate of protection? Vaccines are designed to induce a human immune response that prevents individual disease and may prevent or shorten individual infections. Much of the background for SARS-CoV-2 vaccines was initially based on the research on SARS-CoV infections, which in 2003 caused a global outbreak in 26 countries, the work on another novel coronavirus MERS, the long-term studies of other coronaviruses, and the work on other respiratory viruses such as respiratory syncytial virus (RSV).

In addition to individual protection, vaccines may also induce community or “herd” protection by decreasing transmission of the virus from one individual to another. We know that the two initial mRNA vaccines prevent illness with 94–95% efficacy in individuals. However, we do not yet know if they prevent infection or transmission.

The narrative behind vaccine hesitancy

 VACCINE HESITANCY. Public Trust, Expertise, and the War on Science

The message:

The dominant framework that currently shapes scholarly and popular discourses on the problem of vaccine hesitancy employs a war metaphor to capture the intractability of the problem. The war metaphor also entrenches an “us” (science) versus “them” (publics) division that is not conducive to engagement and resolution. The “war on science” metaphor described a scientized (chapter 4) captured in three popular explanations for vaccine hesitancy: public misunderstanding of science (chapter 1), the influence of cognitive biases on the publics’ reasoning about vaccines (chapter 2), and antiexpertise and science denialism among the publics (chapter 3). All three narratives point to the publics as the problem (and even the enemy), with little attention to “us,” the courageous defenders of science. Yet, as I have shown, the scientizing force of “evidence-based everything” and the linear model of science-to-policy contribute to antagonizing science-publics relations

Take care... 

Vaccine equity

 From Vaccine Nationalism to Vaccine Equity — Finding a Path Forward

From NEJM: 

Vaccinating the world is not only a moral obligation to protect our neighbors, it also serves our self-interest by protecting our security, health, and economy. These goals will not be accomplished by making the world wait for wealthy countries to be vaccinated first. By investing in multilateral partnerships with a sense of shared commitment and employing a global allocation strategy that increases supply and manufacturing, we can meet the urgent challenge of Covid-19, while creating sustainable infrastructures and health systems for the future. Getting the world vaccinated may well be the critical test of our time.

 Anna Billing

Vaccine diplomacy

 PREVENTING THE NEXT PANDEMIC. Vaccine Diplomacy in a Time of Anti-science

Throughout modern history, vaccines have surpassed all other biotechnologies in terms of their impact on global public health. Because of vaccines, smallpox was eradicated, and polio has been driven to near global elimination, while measles deaths have declined more than 90%, and Haemophilus influenzae type b meningitis is now a disease of the past in the United States and elsewhere.

I define one part of vaccine diplomacy as a subset or specific aspect of global health diplomacy in which large-scale vaccine delivery is employed as a humanitarian intervention, often led by one or more of the UN agencies, most notably Gavi, UNICEF, and WHO, or potentially a nongovernmental development organization

 Do vaccines really deserve their own designation for a special type of diplomacy? Yes, I believe so, especially when we consider that between the past century and this one vaccines have saved hundreds of millions of lives [2]. In this sense, the technology of vaccines and their widespread delivery represent our most potent counterforce to war and political instability in modern times. Vaccines represent not only life-saving technologies and unparalleled instruments for reducing human suffering, but they also serve as potent vehicles for promoting international peace and prosperity. They are humankind’s single greatest invention.

The greater issue is that in each of these four cases—smallpox, polio, Ebola, and COVID-19—the global health community had to respond to a crisis and scramble to rapidly develop, test, license, and distribute these vaccines. Could we also implement an anticipatory system in which nations prioritize vaccine diplomacy and routinely employ it to improve international relations? The Global Health Security Agenda does not currently emphasize vaccine development, although new organizations like CEPI and start-up innovation funds from the Japanese and South Korean governments represent promising steps toward global vaccine diplomacy. I am an enthusiastic champion of their efforts. However, I also believe that an opportunity exists for a more comprehensive effort to tackle the world’s most prevalent poverty-related neglected diseases while simultaneously expanding international scientific cooperation as a core element.

The answer might be found somewhere in the G20...

 

Allocating vaccines

 Public Perspectives on COVID-19 Vaccine Prioritization

US adults broadly agreed with the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine’s prioritization framework. Respondents endorsed prioritizing racial/ethnic communities that are disproportionately affected by COVID-19, and older respondents were significantly less likely than younger respondents to endorse prioritizing healthy people older than 65 years. This provides reason for caution about COVID-19 vaccine distribution plans that prioritize healthy adults older than a cutoff age without including those younger than that age with preexisting conditions, that aim solely to prevent the most deaths, or that give no priority to frontline workers or disproportionately affected communities.

Beware.

 

Parov Stelar

The business of vaccines

 Covid-19 and the business of vaccines

The FT explains the business models behind vaccines and asks if the Covid-19 pandemic will fundamentally change the vaccine market. This short documentary features global experts including Bill Gates, the CEOs of Moderna and Gavi, and the lead scientist behind the Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine

COVID epistemology

 Why Does the Pandemic Seem to Be Hitting Some Countries Harder Than Others?

And there lies an epidemiological mystery. The usual trend of death from infectious diseases—malaria, typhoid, diphtheria, H.I.V.—follows a dismal pattern. Lower-income countries are hardest hit, with high-income countries the least affected. But if you look at the pattern of covid-19 deaths reported per capita—deaths, not infections—Belgium, Italy, Spain, the United States, and the United Kingdom are among the worst off.

This is the unfixed conundrum explained by Siddhartha Mukherjee in The New Yorker, And no clear answer, you may read the whole article to confirm it.

 The covid-19 pandemic will teach us many lessons—about virological surveillance, immunology, vaccine development, and social policy, among other topics. One of the lessons concerns not just epidemiology but also epistemology: the theory of how we know what we know. Epidemiology isn’t physics. Human bodies are not Newtonian bodies. When it comes to a crisis that combines social and biological forces, we’ll do well to acknowledge the causal patchwork. What’s needed isn’t Ockham’s razor but Ockham’s quilt.

Above all, what’s needed is humility in the face of an intricately evolving body of evidence. The pandemic could well drift or shift into something that defies our best efforts to model and characterize it. 

 

Great documentary, on Knoedle gallery fake art

COVID-19 innovation response

 The COVID-19 Innovation System

EIT Community COVID-19 Response

 The COVID-19 innovation system represents a departure from business as usual. Considering the remarkable progress to date, especially on vaccine development, this raises the question of whether this model is useful only for crisis times, or whether biomedical innovation policy in “normal” times might productively incorporate some elements of the COVID-19 model as well.

The largest funding response has been from the US government. Roughly $14–$15 billion of the $4 trillion allocated to the COVID-19 response was for R&D for vaccines and treatments.8,9 Though this increased US federally funded biomedical R&D by about one-third (compared to previous NIH funding; see “NIH Data” in the online appendix),10 it is small compared with the potential value of these interventions for ameliorating or preventing the disease and securing a return to normalcy

 

 

 

Vaccine access, now!

 Global equitable access to vaccines, medicines and diagnostics for COVID-19: The role of patents as private governance 

A compulsory licence allows a third party to produce a patented technology without the patent holder’s permission. Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement allows all WTO States to issue compulsory licences subject to certain criteria.19 First, all cases are considered on their individual merits. Thus, a blanket compulsory licence for certain technologies, for example, medicines, is not possible. Second, prior attempts to negotiate a licence for the invention on reasonable terms with the patent holder must be evident. This requirement can be waived in ‘a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use’ which would likely apply for COVID-19. Third, the scope/duration of the licence must be for the limited purpose it was authorised for. Fourth, the licence is non-exclusive so the patent holder can still enter into licensing agreements with others. Fifth, use of the licence is generally permitted predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the State where the compulsory licence is granted. Finally, the patent holder must be paid ‘adequate renumeration’ for the compulsory licence.

So, 

 Crucially, it is only by starting a deeper conversation around the role of patent holders within the health context for COVID-19 and of the role of the public interest within patent law more generally that we can address and pre-empt some of the current obstacles posed by patents to equitable global access to healthcare. Given the significant health implications at stake it is vital that this conversation is informed by a global health and bioethics perspective