Population Health amidst pandemic

 Fitting Community-Centered Population Health (CCPH) Into the Existing Health Care Delivery  Patchwork. The Politics of CCPH

COVID-19 Crisis Creates Opportunities for Community-Centered Population Health Community Health Workers at the Center

Norbert Goldfield et al provides a useful reflection on the current moment in US. And says:

The virus has exposed glaring weaknesses that cannot be unseen. The US health care system’s embrace of patient-centered care is being tested.

We need a new paradigm, one that moves from a patient-centered care system to a community-centered health and social care ecosystem. Unlike much of the current US medical care system, the community sector has lacked funding and development. Strong and consistent sources of support are needed to make this sector viable and keep it flourishing.

Politics will ultimately determine how our current patient-centered acute care–focused health care system will change. The wealthy undoubtedly will continue to have an outsize influence on any legislation promoting CCPH. Despite this fact, we will at least think about becoming better in improving our response before the next pandemic hits.

Both articles deserve being read. 

Hockney

 

Primary care: measuring performance

 Taking Stock of the Global Primary Health Care Measurement Landscape

Better measurement for performance improvement in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: The Primary Health Care Performance Initiative (PHCPI) Experience of Conceptual Framework Development and Indicator Selection

During the pandemic everybody agree about the need for a strong primary care. What does this mean?

Check this framework:

And its Core indicators. Unfortunately they have forgotten the Central de Resultats indicators and data.

That's it.

Hockney

Primary care is the house in the center of the painting.

Health thinking

 El paciente del futuro

Dual practice regulation

Dual practice regulatory mechanisms in the health sector A systematic review of approaches and implementation 

Dual practice refers to physicians concurrent activity, public and private. The conflicts of incentives arise and some regulatory mechanisms are needed.

The regulatory mechanisms that have been employed across countries can be divided into three categories: those that advocate for total banning of DP, those that allow it with restrictions and those that allow it without restriction. Countries that attempted total banning of dual practice, as in Portugal and Greece, could not easily stamp it out. DP continued to exist on a wide scale in Portugal until the ban was lifted in 1993 (Oliveira and Pinto, 2005). Similarly, the ban in Greece from 1983 to 2002 did not prevent public doctors from practising privately (Mossialos et al., 2005). Efforts to ban dual practice failed because of lack of capacity to enforce it. The resources needed to enforce it may not be commensurate with the benefits a country gets from banning it. Moreover, banning dual practice has in some countries been associated with the migration of health workers, especially specialists, from the public to the private sector as well as an international brain drain (Buchan and Sochalski, 2004; Mossialos et al., 2005). In LMIC settings where health workers are underpaid and members of the general population are willing to pay for more convenient and possibly better services, this option might not be viewed as legitimate or even feasible.

 The second category is allowing dual practice with restrictions. This was the most frequent approach used by countries. Financial and licensure restrictions as well as promotional incentives were employed. Financial restrictions included limiting private sector earnings, providing incentives to limit private sector activities, salary increases for public sector workers and performance-based payments. All financial restrictions intrinsically require well-established and adequate health financing systems to fund and monitor public and private sector activity. A combination of tax-based public financing, mandatory health insurance and private insurance might be necessary to counter the financial resource demands of this approach, while supervision, monitoring systems and transparent bureaucracies would be necessary to ensure that private sector activities and earnings are indeed limited and payments are matched by performance.

 Allowing DP without restrictions was noted in countries like Indonesia and Egypt, where DP is routine and accepted. An interesting point to note is that in both countries, the productivity of physicians far exceeded the capacity of the public sector to employ them. Because of the low salaries offered in the public sector, physicians are allowed to supplement their incomes with private sector earnings. This approach is unlikely to be feasible in countries with health worker shortages. Considering the three options of total ban, allowing dual practice with restrictions and allowing it without restrictions, the most feasible for the LMICs is allowing it with restrictions. With health workers who are underpaid, in short supply and working in areas with a high burden of disease, they will scarcely be able to satisfy the demands of the public or the private sector alone.

Hockney

 

DRGs 101

 DIAGNOSIS-RELATED GROUPS: a question and answer guide on case-based classification and payment systems

WHO has released a report on DRGs that is useful as introduction to the concept and the design of payment systems.

The document consists of four parts:

Part 1 outlines definitions, terminology and the main conceptual aspects related to CBG and DRG.

Part 2 covers the assessment phase and highlights questions and issues that policy-makers should consider before taking the decision to introduce a CBG system.

Part 3 delves into the preparation phase by exploring policy and design aspects once a country has decided to introduce a CBG system.

Part 4 is concerned with the implementation phase and discusses implementation questions, requirements for system adjustments and the need for monitoring and revision in order to identify and address unintended impacts of a CBG system.

 

 

Improving CRISPR, a crowd of proteins

Improving CRISPR from Mammoth Biosciences; 

 Genome editing is the process researchers use to make targeted changes to an organism’s DNA (its genome). Scientists have used a variety of technologies for genome editing (see the history of genome editing here). However, since ~2012, CRISPR has made the genome editing processes much easier. CRISPR associated or “Cas” proteins drive this process. They are relatively easy to target to specific DNA sequences. They also work in many organisms.

Yet, the main Cas protein currently used for CRISPR genome editing, SpCas9, has limitations. In this post, we cover SpCas9’s limitations and how newly discovered Cas protein families, Cas14 and CasΦ, potentially overcome these limitations. We hope Cas14 and CasΦ will enable more efficient genome editing in diverse organisms and tissues.

 

Spillover effects of payment systems

 Randomized trial shows healthcare payment reform has equal-sized spillover effects on patients not targeted by reform

From PNAS: 

Changes in the way health insurers pay healthcare providers may not only directly affect the insurer’s patients but may also affect patients covered by other insurers.

This is the research question. And this is the result:

We use a payment reform in TM, which was randomly applied to some markets but not others, to study spillovers of healthcare payment reform. We find spillovers of the same sign and similar magnitude on privately insured MA patients. Naturally, our findings are specific to our setting; the existence, sign and magnitude of any spillovers may well vary across contexts.

Sounds good. However, there is a previous research question, which is the insurer's market share that allows to have the option to change the payment system. This former question is as relevant as the later one.

 

Hockney