The role of Public Service Mutuals

PUBLIC SERVICE MUTUALS:The Next Steps

Let's start with the concept:

Public Service Mutuals are organisations which:
1. have left the public sector (also known as ‘spinning out’), and
2. continue to deliver public services, and
3. in which employee control plays a significant role in their operation.

This is exactly the same as"Entitats de Base Associativa" for Primary Care (p.38 of this journal). Only 3% of all primary care teams follow such model after 18 years (11 out of 369). Only 2 new firms were created in the last decade. It seems that there are some constraints on their development but hardly anybody is working to remove such barriers and others are creating new ones. I have always considered that this model fits perfectly with the engagement of the health professionals in the system instead of being civil servants.
In the UK, the taskforce created to analyse the situation has set up clear recommendations for the future (p.29). Maybe, right now we should replicate something similar that could reverse the trend.

PS. Another report from the King's Fund.

PS. Excellent documentary on ebola outbreak, yesterday at TV3 30 minuts, you can watch it until October 19th.

Regulation and low-value care

Swimming against the Current — What Might Work to Reduce Low-Value Care?

While reading this NEJM article on strategies to reduce low value care, I was wondering why the author has not included any regulatory tool. He explains demand and supply side strategies, as usual, and forgets the crucial role of government. It says:

Public acceptance of a role for policy in reducing the use of low value care in the United States is tenuous but increasing with growing awareness of the burden that health care spending places on federal and state budgets and with patients’ increasing exposure to health care costs.

This is a fact or an opinion of the author?. It is not an argument to avoid a key instrument widely recognised by scholars. An appropriate regulatory role is crucial to provide information and signaling the value of health benefits. No regulation or bad quality regulation contributes to a perfectly designed and costly mess.

Fasten seat belts (2)

Let me ask you a question: Do you agree that your government spends 12% of the pharmaceutical budget in a new drug? I understand that if the answer is yes, you also agree to reduce 12% of current expenditures in patented drugs, reducing quantity, price or the benefit. Otherwise you have to explain clearly where to find 12% of additional resources.
This is what is happening in the UK NHS on new Hepatitis C drug. Have a look at this site for the details. And by now the decision is that it is "prohibitive" and "unaffordable".
Last Sunday CBS 60 minutes broadcasted an interesting report on "eye popping" cost of cancer drugs. I suggest you spend 15 minutes of your time watching it:



Don't miss the details on "financial toxicity" as WSJ highlights. How this can be true?
Nearby, new drug benefits are approved without any known cost-effectiveness-budget impact consideration. This is an example of  alleged "responsive government".

PS. My former post on the same issue.

PS. On bribes, again.

PS. Today this blog has reached the 100.000 visits. That's excellent!!!. I really appreciate your interest in my posts.

The seven damaging dilemmas

Rock, Paper, Scissors: Game Theory in Everyday Life

Let me pick the seven deadly social dilemmas from this book:

• Prisonner Dilemma, when communication between two people is not possible and this prevents any cooperation that would end in mutual profit.
• The Tragedy of the Commons, which is logically equivalent to a series of Prisoner’s Dilemmas played out between different pairs of people in a group.
• The Free Rider problem (a variant of the Tragedy of the Commons), which arises when people take advantage of a community resource without contributing to it.
• Chicken (also known as Brinkmanship), in which each side tries to push the other as close to the edge as they can, with each hoping that the other will back down first. It can arise in situations ranging from someone trying to push into a line of traffic to confrontations between nations that could lead to war, and that sometimes do.
• The Volunteer’s Dilemma, in which someone must make a sacrifice on behalf of the group, but if no one does, then everyone loses out. Each person hopes that someone else
will be the one to make the sacrifice, which could be as trivial as making the effort to put the garbage out or as dramatic as one person sacrificing his or her life to save others.
• The Battle of the Sexes, in which two people have different preferences, such as a husband who wants to go to a ball game while his wife would prefer to go to a movie. The catch is that each would rather share the other’s company than pursue their own preference alone.
• Stag Hunt, in which cooperation between members of a group gives them a good chance of success in a risky, highreturn venture, but an individual can win a guaranteed but lower reward by breaking the cooperation and going it alone.

Think for a similar situations in recent cases in close politics and health policy and management. For sure the improvement on the final resolution is related with this statement:

Cooperation would lead to the best overall outcome in all of these cases, but Nash’s trap (which is now called a Nash equilibrium) draws us by the logic of our own self-interest into a situation in which at least one of the parties fares worse but from which they can’t escape without faring worse still.

And if this is so, what then must we do?

• Changing Our Attitudes: If we came to believe that it was immoral to cheat on cooperation, for example, that would obviously help to resolve many social dilemmas.
• Benevolent Authority: Relying on an external authority to enforce cooperation and fair play.
• Self-Enforcing Strategies: Developing strategies that carry their own enforcement so there is no incentive to cheat on cooperation once it has been established. 

And if this is so, how can we implement it?
And so on... 

Fasten seat belts

We have entered into an unknown new world: drug prices -for innovative drugs- are on track to disappear. The NHS has agreed a cap on expenditure for a hepatitis C (sofobusvir) new drug in €125m without disclosing the unit price. Some people may consider it an opaque strategy in times that politicians claim transparency.
In my opinion, such a situation allows to understand better that the pharmaceutical market for innovative drugs is mostly a monopsony (one buyer) in a monopoly (one seller), it is not a competitive market - and this is what I have always considered. Therefore, resource allocation is the result of a bargaining between both parties, and the unit price is irrelevant. The buyer wants to maximize health,  the seller is maximizing income, this is exactly the struggle.
The key question is: How much is NHS willing to pay for better health?. As far as  the budget is limited, the number of treatments times the price is not the right way to proceed to maximize health under constrained resources.
Any government has to set priorities for expenditure according to expected health value created. This information should be public. In any case, when a new drug is available the government should clearly define which benefits are cancelled and which are acceptable. A responsible minister can't  agree new expenditures without any budget.
Therefore, innovative pharmaceutical market is not really a market -right now is clear- and governments should set priorities according to resources available -right now is also clear that they haven't done it-.
Fasten seat belts, we are entering into trying times without any political compass-gps. Citizens are expecting something different. I still remember when Victor Fuchs told long time ago: usually health economists discuss incremental cost-effectiveness in limited marginal terms, the real issue appears when such an amount is enormous. The case of hepatitis C is the example of such a situation, and only health policy and deliberative democracy are the tools to confront it. Unfortunately, this was not the strategy applied nearby.

PS. Catalonia in contention, at Harvard Political Review. Must read, if you are interested on what's going on. Otherwise, try Bloomberg op-ed or LAtimes.

PS. Reading Francesc-Marc Alvaro op-ed I always learn something.

PS. Rating catalans' well-being by OECD.

Ricard Molina. Muntaner-Velódromo. Galeria Barnadas

Bundled payments, update

While I was reading the HA blog I  thought that the word innovation is like a joker, when somebody has a real concern about potential income in the future, any change may harm innovation. The current situation in US of bundled payments is still embryonic and biased towards certain services. Bundled payments need to be holistic, not partial in order to deliver clear results. Otherwise, incentives in non-regulated areas increase. Maybe those that are concerned with innovation will move towards such areas...

Fines, settlements and reputation

Reputation Capital: Building and Maintaining Trust in the 21st Century

In the last decade there has been a proliferation of cases of fraudulent marketing practices and bribery in pharmaceutical industry. In the case of US you may check the details at Propublica. In EU we don't have a similar summary (as far as I know). The latest case in EU involves 6 companies and fines of €427m . In China, the latest case is about $500m fines for bribery. This case was started by an anonymous whistleblower.
While it is no surprise that pharmaceutical industry reputation is weak, corporate social responsibility is still supported by the firms. I can't understand why. In the page 347 of this book you'll find a chapter on this issue: "Is there no prescription? Reputation in the pharmaceutical industry". It says:

If the pharmaceutical industry does not present itself in an active and self-confident way, it cannot expect the situation to improve. For, apart from itself, it has no other advocates