Es mostren les entrades ordenades per rellevància per a la consulta testing covid. Ordena per data Mostra totes les entrades
Es mostren les entrades ordenades per rellevància per a la consulta testing covid. Ordena per data Mostra totes les entrades

09 d’abril 2020

Understanding COVID-19

How Will COVID-19 Affect the Health Care Economy?

COVID-19 and risks to the supply and quality of tests, drugs, and vaccines

Virtual health care in the era of COVID-19

Daily briefing: This is the state of COVID-19 vaccine development now

Disease Control, Civil Liberties, and Mass Testing — Calibrating Restrictions during the Covid-19 Pandemic

Thousands of coronavirus tests are going unused in US labs

Selected links on COVID-19.

From NEJM
Consider, for example, a policy in which people seeking to return to work, school, or social activities are asked to undergo baseline testing for infection and antibodies. Positive tests for infection would trigger self-isolation. Negative tests would certify freedom of movement for a defined period — say, 2 or 3 weeks — after which additional negative tests would renew the certification. If antibodies are determined to provide long-term protection against both reinfection and transmission — which is plausible but not yet established — a positive serologic test would warrant longer-term certification.
Aggregating test results at community and state levels would support a reliable disease-surveillance system. A testing regimen’s stringency could then be dialed up or down, depending on community prevalence of Covid-19. China is following a version of this approach by grading community risk on a four-tier, color-coded scale.
And...if antibodies and infection are negative? What do you do? And... if this affects to 85% of population?. As is the case of Heinberg in Germany?

I would like to highlight the last one, how spply and demand for lab test doesn't match, in US and elsewhere...

10 de novembre 2020

Diagnostic Testing for the COVID-19 Pandemic (again)

 Rapid Expert Consultation on Critical Issues in Diagnostic Testing for the COVID-19 Pandemic

Yesterday I was thinking about the implications of having spare structural capacity in hospitals for pandemics and disasters. With a larger capacity, the need for lockdown to preserve health system operations would be less important. However, how much capacity is needed is uncertain. Therefore, the cost and benefit of spare capacity of the health system is very difficult to estimate. And I would add, it is really much more difficult to manage such investment, because spare capacity in physical terms is not enough, you would need also spare capacity in human resources!. Maybe there is a technological innovation that I can foresee. Forget it. 

Right now the hotest issue are the tests and the vaccine. And NASEM has released a rapid consultation of interest about tests.

This rapid expert consultation draws attention to four critical areas in developing diagnostic testing and strategies to reduce the number of COVID-19 infections and deaths: (1) advantages and limitations of reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing for viral RNA; (2) the status of POC testing; (3) testing strategies, namely, considerations in the deployment of types and sequences of tests; and (4) next-generation testing that offers the prospect of highthroughput, rapid, and less expensive testing.

If you want to know the state of the art, this is the document to read. I can't see anywhere any cost-benefit approach of different options...We are still dealing with precision and accuracy, i.e. effectiveness.

PS. Quite surprising that today everybody is talking about a vaccine and its 90% effectiveness without any scientific paper being published. Can you accept that?. Information merchants looking for attention.


 

26 de març 2020

Smart testing in coronavirus pandemic

We need smart coronavirus testing, not just more testing

Key messages by Mostashari and Emanuel:
The first two questions, which will be key to guiding policymakers on whether the extreme measures taken to suppress the outbreak are working, are these: Is the Covid-19 outbreak in a city or state getting better or worse? And how fast?
To know if Covid-19 is getting better or worse, we need to know how the percentage of positive cases — not the number — changes day by day, accounting for delays in testing and reporting and how the percentages change in response to public health measures such as sheltering-in-place or suppression. This will tell us how effective these measures are in curtailing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and thus whether when social restrictions could be relaxed or additional policies might need to be implemented.
The other two questions that need answers are essential for guiding doctors in their medical decision making: Who is getting Covid-19? And what are their outcomes?
First, as a condition of receiving approval and test kits, laboratories should be required to submit basic information like age, county of residence, and testing site on every person tested — not just the positives.
Second, we need a sero survey of multiple communities. Such studies test blood samples from randomly chosen individuals in a defined population. This is the way to assess the real percentage of people in a community who test positive for recent coronavirus infection. This gives a picture that is wider than just the individuals who are bringing themselves in for testing. Right now we simply have no idea how many Americans are infected with the coronavirus. This will be a key input to models trying to predict when herd immunity can begin to blunt the outbreak.

PS. An epidemic calculator 
PS. Current situation of the pandemic in our country.


08 de juny 2020

Covid-19 testing landscape

COVID-19 diagnostics in context

This is the best summary of current supply of diagnostic tests for Covid-19:
COVID-19 tests can be grouped as nucleic acid, serological, antigen, and ancillary tests, all of which play distinct roles in hospital, point-of-care, or large-scale population testing.
Table 1 summarizes the existing and emerging tests, current at the time of writing (May 2020). A continuously updated version of this table is available at https://csb.mgh.harvard.edu/covid
Eric Topol says:
There are now *88* @US_FDA  cleared (by EUA) #COVID19 tests so far. Their false negative rates range from 10-48% (by post-release reports).
Might be better to have less tests, more accuracy, with faster turnaround
I agree.



Table 1 Performance comparison of different test types.
Throughput is determined by process type and assay time. In general, automated plate-based assays have higher daily throughputs. Hashtag (#) indicates example systems that have received FDA emergency use authorization (FDA-EUA). See https://csb.mgh.harvard.edu/covid to access continuously updated information. PCR, polymerase chain reaction; PCR-POC, PCR–point-of-care; ddPCR, digital droplet PCR; NEAR, nicking endonuclease amplification reaction; RCA, rolling circle amplification; SHERLOCK, specific high-sensitivity enzymatic reporter; DETECTR, DNA endonuclease-targeted CRISPR transreporter; NGS, next-generation sequencing; μNMR, micro–nuclear magnetic resonance; LFA, lateral flow assay; ELISA, enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay; CLIA, chemiluminescence immunoassay; EIA, enzyme immunoassay; ECLIA, electrochemiluminescence immunoassay; ECS, electrochemical sensing; VAT, viral antigen assay; IFM, immunofluorescence microscopy; WB, Western blot.




TypeTargetVirusAssay timeProcess typeFDA-EUAExamples
PCRViral RNASARS-CoV-22–8 hours; >12 hoursPlate56#Roche, #LabCorp,
#BioMerieux,
#Qiagen,
#Perkin-Elmer,
#Becton Dickinson,
#Luminex, #Thermo
Fisher, others
PCR-POCViral RNASARS-CoV-2<1 hour="" td="">Cartridge2#Cepheid, #Mesa,
Credo
ddPCRViral RNASARS-CoV-22–4 hoursManual1#BioRAD
NEARViral RNASARS-CoV-215 minCartridge1#Abbott
OMEGAViral RNASARS-CoV-21 hourPlate1#Atila BioSystems
RCAViral RNASARS-CoV2 hours0
SHERLOCKViral RNASARS-CoV-21.5 hoursKit1#Sherlock
Biosciences
(CAS13a)
DETECTRViral RNASARS-CoV-21 hourKit0Mammoth
Biosciences
(CAS12a)
NGSViral RNASARS-CoV-2Days1#IDbyDNA, Vision,
Illumina
μNMRViral RNASARS-CoV-22 hoursCartridge0T2 Biosystems
LFAIgG, IgMSARS-CoV-215 minCartridge3#Cellex,
#Sugentech,
#ChemBio, Innovita
ELISAIgG, IgMSARS-CoV-22–4 hoursPlate4#Mount Sinai,
#Ortho-Clinical (2),
#EUROIMMUN US
Inc., BioRAD, Snibe,
Zhejiang orient,
Creative Dx
CLIAIgG, IgMSARS-CoV-230 minCartridge2#Abbott, #DiaSorin
EIAIgG, IgMSARS-CoV-22 hoursPlate1#BioRAD
MIAIgG, IgMSARS-CoV-2Plate1#Wadsworth Center
ECLIAIgG, IgMSARS-CoV-220 minPlate1#Roche
ECSIgG, cytokineSARS-CoV-21 hourCartridge0Accure Health
VATViral antigenSARS-CoV-220 minCartridge1#Quidel, Sona NT,
RayBiotech, SD
Biosensors, Bioeasy
MicroarraysIg epitopesSARS-CoV-21.5 hoursPlate0RayBiotech,
PEPperPRINT
IFMViral proteinSARS-CoV3 hoursManual0
WBIgG, IgM; viral proteinSARS-CoV4 hoursManual0


08 de maig 2020

Stop covid with CRISPR Diagnostics

With Crispr, a Possible Quick Test for the Coronavirus

Sherlock's quick, CRISPR-based coronavirus test gets emergency nod

STOP COVID

Point-of-care testing for COVID-19 using SHERLOCK diagnostics

Great!
The FDA granted its first emergency authorization for a CRISPR-based test for COVID-19, developed by Sherlock Biosciences, designed to turn results around in about an hour compared to the four to six hours needed for other molecular diagnostics.
The test is based on the company’s namesake technology, SHERLOCK, short for Specific High-sensitivity Enzymatic Reporter unLOCKing, a Cas13a-based CRISPR system that targets RNA rather than DNA. It looks for an RNA sequence specific to SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, in patient samples taken from the upper airways with a swab or from airways in the lungs known as bronchoalveolar washing.
“If it’s there, it attaches to the Cas13 enzyme and activates it, which leads to the chewing up and cleaving of RNA probes,” Sherlock CEO Rahul Dhanda told FierceMedTech. When cleaved, those RNA molecules release a fluorescent signal to show the virus is present.







17 d’agost 2022

Pandemethics (2)

 Pandemic Bioethics

Contents:
Chapter 1 Historical Epidemics
The Spanish Flu of 1918
Cholera
Plague
Smallpox
Yellow Fever
Malaria
Chapter 2 Modern Viral Pandemics
Polio
Asian Flu of 1957 and Hong Kong Flu of 1968
Ebola
Swine Flu of 1976
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
SARS1
Swine Flu of 2009
Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS)
Zika
Other Viral Diseases Affecting Humans
Chapter 3 The Medical Nature of SARS2
Disputed Origins of SARS2
The Clinical Course of COVID-19
Transmission and Immunity
Chapter 4 Policies for Containment
Quarantine as a Preventive Allocation Strategy
Four Models of Fighting Pandemics
Successes and Failures around the World
Intermittent Lockdowns, Denial, and the American Confusion
Chapter 5 Who Should Live When Not All Can?
Ethical Theories as Guides
Historical Background: The God Committee and Social Worth
A Relevant Digression: “Sickest First” Allocation and UNOS
Enter Bioethicists
Saints and Sacrifice
Covid, Cognitively Challenged Patients, and Rights of Disabled Persons
Unexpected Allocation Issues
Chapter 6 Developing Vaccines
A Brief History of Vaccines
Kinds of Vaccines
Ethical Issues in Developing Vaccines
Speeding Up Development of Experimental Vaccines
Other Problems with Vaccine Trials
Politics and Vaccines for Covid
Chapter 7 Allocating Vaccines
Success with Quick Production of Vaccines
The CDC and the States
Ability to Pay and Access to Vaccines
Allocation Priorities
Vaccination Complexities
Mandatory Vaccinations
Global Vaccine Distribution
Possible Bad Scenarios
Chapter 8 Acts and Omissions, the Trolley Problem, and Prisoner’s Dilemmas
Acts vesus Omissions
The Trolley Problem
Prisoner’s Dilemmas and Vaccination Uptake
Chapter 9 Liberty and Privacy
Philosophical Positions on Liberty
Problems of Contact Tracing
Controlling Pandemics versus Protecting Privacy
Privacy of Genetic Information Collected during Testing in Pandemics
Chapter 10 Status Certificates
Defining Key Terms
What Is the Purpose of Status Certificates?
Benefits of Status Certificates
Problems with Status Certificates
Chapter 11 Structural Inequalities and Vulnerable Groups
Who Is Most Vulnerable in a Pandemic?
Differences in Efforts to Control Infection in Different Vulnerable Groups
Chapter 12 Leadership during Pandemics
Leadership and the Virtue of Trust
The WHO’s Leaders Made Mistakes
Donald Trump and American Leadership
Judgment of US Leaders during the Pandemic
Chapter 13 The Future
The Future of COVID-19
Lessons to Learn
More Pandemics Will Come
What Will Happen Next?


06 de juny 2020

Tackling COVID-19 beyond testing

How We Can Tackle the COVID-19 Crisis Beyond Testing

If you wear a smartwatch or fitness tracker, you can play a role in monitoring the spread of COVID-19 and other viral diseases like the flu. In this Front Row lecture, Eric Topol, MD, and Jennifer Radin, PhD, discuss how they’re calling on the public to share data from wearable devices for a study that’s helping scientists flag the early onset of contagious respiratory illnesses. By harnessing this key data—including heart rates, sleep and activity levels—from hundreds of thousands of individuals, they seek to improve real-time disease surveillance.

04 de maig 2020

How testing market fails during a pandemic


The evidence of market failure during this pandemic is everywhere. Shortages, excessive prices, unavailable capacity...It is a clear example of mismatch between demand and supply. The question is, Can we do it otherwise?. In this article there are some hints for resource allocation for testing activities.

Globally, the development of diagnostics has long been left to markets, many of which are highly specialized. But while there are diagnostics markets for major infectious and non-infectious diseases, and even neglected tropical diseases, there is none for pandemic diseases.
Governments can of course counteract market deficiencies, but the commonly used mechanisms still require a trace level of demand, which does not exist for pandemic-disease diagnostics until the brink of an outbreak. And national governments, subject as they are to political and ideological constraints, cannot be relied upon always to create markets with the same swiftness demonstrated by South Korea. Reactive market creation is therefore not the way forward.
Instead, national governments should support the creation of a global coordinating platform for pandemic preparedness. Such a platform can take the lead in raising and pooling capital to channel toward rapid development, production, and distribution of diagnostics for pandemic diseases.
The blueprint for such a platform already exists. The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) is a coordinating mechanism focused on advancing vaccine development and facilitating clinical validation, mass-scale manufacturing, and stockpiling. By reducing uncertainty and minimizing disruptions, CEPI makes vaccine markets more secure, accessible, and dynamic.
CEPI relies on both traditional financing (large grants from governments and foundations) and innovative financing (the returns from instruments like the International Finance Facility for Immunization, or IFFIm). In the event of an outbreak, CEPI uses instruments like Advanced Market Commitments (AMCs) or volume guarantees – which can be structured through mechanisms like the Global Health Investment Fund and InnovFin, or as conditional pledges to IFFIm and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance – to enable it to scale up production quickly.
This blueprint can easily be replicated for diagnostics. All that is needed is a specialized entity – an institution or initiative that couples research and development with market access. 

20 d’abril 2020

Back to work

NATIONAL COVID-19 TESTING ACTION PLAN

Some papers:
Rockefeller Foundation has issued a document of interest about testing and going back to work.
AEI document here.
Center for American Progress document here.
Duke University here.
Harvard University here.
Johns Hopkins University here.

29 de setembre 2021

The pandemic in US

 Uncontrolled Spread. Why COVID-19 Crushed Us and How We Can Defeat the Next Pandemic

New book by Scott Gottlieb , former FDA comissioner

COVID revealed dangerous gaps in the US public health preparedness, medical infrastructure, and healthcare system. We lacked the public health capacity and resiliency we thought we had. In the most advanced healthcare system in the world, we ran out of medical masks. We had to retrofit anesthesia machines and turn them into respirators. We didn’t have enough swabs to collect samples from patients’ noses.

Our system was set up well to handle singular, technology-intensive, and complex problems like developing a novel vaccine or antibody drugs. We do this better than anyone. But it faltered when we were faced with more mundane problems like manufacturing those vaccines in bulk, deploying testing centers, or making nose swabs to collect respiratory samples. When we finally developed safe and effective therapeutics and vaccines that could treat or prevent infection, we couldn’t manufacture enough of them in time to supply the nation for the winter surge. We had to set up elaborate rationing schemes. Then, we were unable to establish an efficient distribution plan. Antibody drugs went unused because we couldn’t deliver them. 

The virus made clear that we’ll need to fundamentally alter the way we approach all of these risks. If we don’t, our society will remain excessively vulnerable. For starters, we’ll have to lean much more on our intelligence agencies, and in a different fashion. International agreements alone haven’t provided us with the information we need about emerging threats. There’s little reason to believe they’ll perform much better in the future. The devastation caused by the pandemic proved that these risks, and our preparedness for them, is a matter of national security on par with other threats. We’re going to have to build the capacity to seek out the information we need to protect ourselves. Sometimes that will demand that we avail ourselves of the tools and tradecraft of our clandestine services. The challenge will be to maintain collaboration and multilateral efforts even as we turn more heavily toward intelligence services to guard against the risk of new contagions. 





 

21 de setembre 2020

Stop Covid with CRISPR Diagnostics (3)

 Detection of SARS-CoV-2 with SHERLOCK One-Pot Testing

Former posts have highlighted the potential of CRISPR for molecular  diagnostics, specially in case of Covid. Now NEJM provides details of Sherlock test.



Protocol here



16 de setembre 2020

Prioritizing population health or the economy

 Economics in the Age of COVID-19

Open access book by Joshua Gans. Must read. Controversial. Telling.

Forget false dilemmas, health vs economy.

The starting point is to understand that at any given point in time, there is only so much we can produce. Broadly speaking, if we want to have better public health outcomes, we need to take resources from elsewhere and so we can imagine that we get less of other stuff – which we would broadly call ‘the economy.’ What makes these trade-offs easy to grasp is that when we talk about producing some more public health, we can then think about how much less of the economy we get. Moreover, we are also confident that as we push for each extra bit of health, the more of the economy we have to give up each time. So, if our public health is poor, it is relatively ‘cheap’ (in terms of a reduction in the economy) to get more of it. When our public health is already prioritized, pushing the system further to gain even more health is relatively ”expensive” in terms of reductions to the economy. Thus, we do end up balancing and we don’t have the best imaginable public health outcomes because, frankly, we have decided not to pay the price. (In the technical interlude at the end of this chapter, I put all of this discussion in graphical terms that might be familiar to an Econ 101 student – the production possibilities frontier. You can delve into that or skip as you see fit.)

One reason a pandemic is awful is that it constrains even further what we can do with our scarce resources. We can neither sustain the level of the economy we had before without a decline in public health or vice versa. That in of itself would not pose an issue for our ability to fine-tune. Instead, there are two factors that fundamentally mean that we can no longer fine-tune and instead face a choice between prioritizing public health or the economy without the ability to balance those choices. Those two factors are (1) that a pandemic hollows out our ability to maintain the same balance between health and the economy and (2) that our choice of priority changes our options going forward; that is, they can drift.

Let’s begin with hollowing out. Recall that our ability to obtain our current balance of health and the economy is that we recognize that having a little more health or a little more economy is not worth the price in terms of what we give up for each. Absent other innovations – say a vaccine or, as I will discuss later, testing – the way to achieve our previous level of public health in the face of a pandemic is to socially distance. That means that we cannot physically interact with one another and, therefore, to a very large extent, we can no longer produce the economic outcomes we once could.

The problem is that the pandemic now changes the price of obtaining a little improvement in the economy. In order to do that, we must now give up a large degree of health. Being able to have slightly larger groups of people interact or have a few workplaces open poses a potentially high risk to public health because of the way a coronavirus might spread. Put simply, the option of sacrificing a little public health for having a little more economy is no longer open to us.

This also works on the flip side. One option with dealing with a pandemic is simply to ignore it and let life go on as usual. The hope from that plan would be to maintain the economy at its previous level, see the virus spread through much of the population, hope not too many people die and have a one to two-year large decline in public health. This was sometimes referred to as allowing the virus to ‘burn through’ the population. Even here the ability to fine-tune is compromised. You might want to achieve a slightly smaller loss of life from the pandemic but find now that the price of doing that, as even that would require a large amount of social distancing, has become very high.

Hollowing out means that you no longer want to maintain the same balance of the economy and health as you did previously. Instead, the ‘best’ choices are to prioritize one or the other. To be sure, there is a trade-off but no longer can you dial up a little bit more of this and a little bit less of that, you either prioritize the economy or you prioritize public health. You don’t want to try and do both.



  PS: update and subscribe alerts to the new twitter account @econsalut