Porter’s model identifies five forces that affect the strategic position of a particular business: the threat of new entrants to the market, the threat of substitute products or services, the bargaining power of customers, the bargaining power of suppliers, and the intensity of competitive rivalry in the industry. The goal of strategy is to control these five forces in such a way as to build a moat around the business and thereby render it unassailable.Now platforms add a new perspective,
Thus, when a firm can erect barriers to entry, it can keep competitors out, and entrants with substitute products cannot storm the castle. When a firm can subjugate suppliers, competition among them weakens their bargaining power so the firm can keep its costs low. When a firm can subjugate buyers by keeping them relatively small, disunited, and powerless, the firm can keep its prices high.
In this model, the firm maximizes profits by avoiding ruinous competition for itself but encouraging it for everyone else in the value chain. Advantage is found in industry structures that create a protective moat—one that enables the firm to segment markets, differentiate products, control resources, avoid price wars, and defend its profit margins.
For decades, companies have studied the five forces model and used it to guide their decisions about which markets to enter and exit, what mergers or acquisitions to consider, what sorts of product innovation to pursue, and what supply chain strategies to employ.
Enter platforms. Many of the insights embodied in the five forces, resource-based, and hypercompetition models remain valid, but two new realities are now shaking up the world of strategy.These are excerpts from the book "Platform revolution" a must read if you want to understand what's going on in value creation in a connected world. In chapter 12 you'll find some comments on health sector, very succint and general.
First, firms that understand how platforms work can now intentionally manipulate network effects to remake markets, not just respond to them. The implicit assumption in traditional business strategy that competition is a zero-sum game is far less applicable in the world of platforms. Rather than re-dividing a pie of more-or-less static size, platform businesses often grow the pie (as, for example, Amazon has done by innovating new models, such as self-publishing and publishing on demand, within the traditional book industry) or create an alternative pie that taps new markets and sources of supply (as Airbnb and Uber have done alongside the traditional hotel and taxi industries). Actively managing network effects changes the shape of markets rather than taking them as fixed.
Second, platforms turn businesses inside out, moving managerial influence from inside to outside the firm’s boundaries. Thus, a firm no longer needs to seize every new opportunity on its own; instead, it can pursue only the best opportunities while helping ecosystem partners seize the others, with all partners sharing the value they jointly create.13
These two new realities add a dramatic layer of complexity to business competition. Platform strategy resembles traditional strategy much the way three-dimensional chess resembles the traditional game.14 Within the ecosystem, the lead firm negotiates dynamic tradeoffs involving competition at three levels: platform against platform, platform against partner, and partner against partner.
First, higher income was associated with greater longevity throughout the income distribution.The gap in life expectancy between the richest 1% and poorest 1% of individuals was 14.6years (95% CI, 14.4to 14.8years) for men and 10.1 years (95% CI,9.9 to 10.3 years) for women.
Second, inequality in life expectancy increased over time. Between 2001 and 2014, life expectancy increased by 2.34 years for men and 2.91 years for women in the top 5%of the income distribution, but by only 0.32 years for men and 0.04 years for women in the bottom 5%(P < .001 for the differences for both sexes).
Third, life expectancy for low-income individuals varied substantially across local areas. In the bottom income quartile, life expectancy differed by approximately 4.5 years between areas with the highest and lowest longevity.Changes in life expectancy between 2001 and 2014 ranged from gains of more than 4 years to losses of more than 2 years across areas.
Fourth, geographic differences in life expectancy for individuals in the lowest income quartile were significantly correlated with health behaviors such as smoking(r = −0.69,P < .001),but were not significantly correlated with access to medical care, physical environmental factors, income inequality, or labor market conditions. Life expectancy for low-income individuals was positively correlated with the local area fraction of immigrants (r = 0.72, P < .001), fraction of college graduates (r = 0.42, P < .001), and government expenditures (r = 0.57, P < .001).Differences are huge. Confronting the issue from a policy perspective is not that easy. Individual health behaviors are the key to understand what's going on.
The Platform Manifesto
1. The ecosystem is the new warehouse
2. The ecosystem is also the new supply chain
3. The network effect is the new driver for scale
4. Data is the new dollar
5. Community management is the new human resources management
6. Liquidity management is the new inventory control
7. Curation and reputation are the new quality control
8. User journeys are the new sales funnels
9. Distribution is the new destination
10. Behavior design is the new loyalty program
11. Data science is the new business process optimization
12. Social feedback is the new sales commission
13. Algorithms are the new decision makers
14. Real-time customization is the new market research
15. Plug-and-play is the new business development
16. The invisible hand is the new iron fist
The question of whether there is a profound tension between our professional norms and our self interest deserves careful attention. Conflict of interest in economics gained much (unwanted) attention after the documentary Inside Job accused some finance economists of doing analysis favorable to financial industry interests while receiving undisclosed pay from those same interests. Even if you believe, as I do, that Inside Job was unfair to some of its targets, it did fuel a crisis of confidence in economists that we all have a strong interest in correcting. The response has been to strengthen the norms that we disclose possible conflict of interests in our research and policy recommendations; this is surely a good thing. An example from my own field of development is that researchers on foreign aid should disclose whether they are employees of or consultants to agencies dispensing foreign aid (or conversely, recipients of funding from antiaid interests).
Yet the issue of conflict of interest is too complex to be so quickly dismissed by a simple disclosure requirement.The handbook by DeMartino and McCloskey is an excellent contribution to shed some light on the issue:
The case for economic ethics is simple and, we think, undeniable. Economists enjoy tremendous influence today over the life chances of others—innumerable others. That is the heart of the matter. The influence of economists arises from their expertise in a field vital to social wellbeing,...
freedom, and other valued goals. As economists know better than anyone, when you monopolize a resource that others need, you exert power over them. Moreover, in recent years, economists’ influence has been amplified by institutional developments. Independent central banks, the multilateral development banks, and other international financial institutions are often in a position to set economic policy and even engage in social engineering without much oversight by elected officials or the public. Economists are at the helm of such institutions and occupy staff positions in the departments where the actual work gets done. Combined with its intellectual monopoly, institutional power enhances the ability of the economics profession to alter the course of human affairs—for the better, of course, but also, sometimes, for the worse.
Influence over the lives of others, which can be immense, coupled with the risk of doing even substantial foreseeable and unforeseeable harm, implies that economic practice is ethically fraught. And yet the profession largely manages to ignore the attending burdens. Perhaps because economists understand that harm is universal in economics, the Hippocratic tradition appears to offer no insight into how economists should comport themselves. What does “do no harm” mean in a world where there are no free lunches and where all actions (including doing nothing) entail tradeoffs? And perhaps because economists often paint on big canvases, where they affect the lives of thousands or even millions of people all at once rather than individual clients one by one, clinical ethics seems largely irrelevant. The scale of economic interventions generates among economists a fear that serious and open engagement with professional ethical issues would paralyze them with doubt in those moments of human need when what is called for instead is focused audacity.This is a real call for action into an improvement of practices and behaviors of economists.
