Insuring biomarkers coverage

From the Past to the Present:Insurer Coverage Frameworks for Next-Generation Tumor Sequencing

Technology is one step ahead regulation and coverage. Sounds normal. However, the size of this step may be bigger than you think if we refer to next generation sequencing biomarkers. A new article in Value in Health journal covers this topic in detail.

One of the challenges of insurance coverage for next-generation sequencing is that it pushes the very boundaries of the underlined framework used by insurers in coverage decisions.  For example,to receive insurance coverage, a medical technology must be determined “medically necessary” and not “experimental/investigational.” Next-generation sequencing blurs the boundaries between these two concepts, making coverage decisions difficult.

Therefore some trade-offs are unavoidable. Inside the article you'll find them.

Anoro, Barnadas gallery

Healthcare services governance

The Firm Divided
Manager-Shareholder Conflict and the Fight for Control of the Modern Corporation

There is a unique feature of health services,- where public or non-profit organizations play a major role- it requires a deep understanding of the governance of the firms and its conflicts.
A new book provides a summary for private firms. In my opinion, most of the recommendations are applicable to public and not-for-profit organizations.

There are many partial solutions to manager–shareholder conflict, but none of them
work perfectly. In fact, even when they are all combined, the outcome is far from perfect. In some solutions, shareholders and directors play a hands-on role, taking responsibility themselves for keeping managers in line. In short, they monitor. Shareholders do some monitoring themselves; the rest they leave to a board of directors, which they elect—but everyone is involved in managing the managers. Directors play more of a hands-off role in the next set of solutions.

They set a few ground rules that executives must follow, create few incentives, and then step back and allow events to unfold. That is, they motivate. 

However, directors cannot do everything themselves, so in the third set of solutions they enlist outside parties to do some of the monitoring and motivating on their behalf. They delegate. These outsiders have their own selfish reasons for getting involved, but their presence can still benefit shareholders. 

As a last resort, and the last time that shareholders are even indirectly involved in the game, shareholders can sell, or threaten to sell, their shares to another firm. Selling is the ultimate hands-off policy. 

All of these approaches to corporate governance occur in a world of rules and regulations. That is why there is a final solution to manager–shareholder conflict, of which shareholders are entirely passive beneficiaries: the fight to change the rules of the game. These are the key steps to effective corporate governance: monitor, motivate, delegate, sell. The rules of the game matter as well.

Definitely, the last resort doesn't apply to publicly owned and nonprofit organizations. For private managers, this is a real threat, not replicable elsewhere. It is precisely for this reason that governance matters and an additional effort should be devoted.

Economics of ownership in healthcare

Private Provision of Publicly Funded Health Care: The Economics of Ownership

You'll find an interesting review of public private provision by Martin Chalkley in this brief. It says:

Viewed through the lens of economics, concern over ownership arises from the impossibility of complete contracts between purchasers of health care and providers of health care. Were complete contracts feasible they would render the question of ownership redundant. But contracts will always be incomplete: it is not possible to specify in advance all of the relevant circumstances around the care of every patient who is to be served, so as to ensure that they receive appropriate quality of care at a cost that reflects complete efficiency and does not leave the provider either with unsustainable losses or supernormal profits.

But the existence of the collective purchaser(s) for health care means that purchasers have power that individual consumers in other sectors do not have. NHS purchasing arrangements have the potential to ensure that private ownership does not lead either to a ‘race to the bottom’ – sacrificing quality in order to cut costs – or to supernormal profits being earned – which would siphon off NHS funds that could otherwise be used to deliver more health care.

And the final statement:

 We conclude overall that when considering the ownership of health care providers in a publicly funded health care system, statements such as “public good, private bad”, or the other way about, are misplaced. All health care providers require regulation. All health care providers require carefully thought out contractual arrangements that recognise the incentives and constraints they operate with – and these do differ between ownership types. The collective nature of health care purchasing provides the means for achieving this.

That's it. A clear message for any open-mind politician.